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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Pruitfs Complaint 
challenging an adoption based on its ruling that he failed to establish a relationship 
with the child under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-30-4.15(4) or 78-30-4.14(2)(b)? 
This question was raised by the defendant's motion to dismiss, R. 70, and 
the district court concluded as a matter of law that, having failed to comply with the 
requirements of the Adoption Code, Mr. Pruitt was tknot entitled to object to any petition 
or release of the child for adoption." R. 197. 
Whether Mr. Pruitt established a legal interest in the child depends on 
whether he satisfied all of the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4) or strictly 
complied with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b). This is a mixed 
question involving '"the application of law to fact or, stated more fully, the determination 
of whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law.'" State v. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, t 26 n. 3, 63 P.3d 650, quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 
(Utah 1994). Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed for abuse of discretion in 
apphing the law to the facts. Woodhaven Apartments v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918, 920 
(I Jtah 1997), citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
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J. Was the "impossibility" exception, which was a judicially 
created exception to Utah's old adoption code, abrogated by the passage of the 
current provisions applicable to unmarried biological fathers? 
Mr. Pruitt raised the impossibility exception in paragraph 25 of his 
Complaint, R. 56, as well as in his Memorandum in Support of Rule 59(e) Motion. 
R. 159-62. 
The district court did not reach the question of whether the impossibility 
exception had been abrogated because it found that Mr. Pruitt did not establish any 
interest in the child by failing to comply with the requirements of Utah law. From the 
district court's perspective, however, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-30-4.15(4) and 
78-30-4.14(2)(b) together have replaced the impossibility exception. Adoption Center 
shares this view. This Court should review the district court's statutory interpretation for 
correctness, according no deference. State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38, 39-40 (Utah 1995). 
3. If the "impossibility" exception has not been abrogated, can 
Mr. Pruitt raise the "impossibility" exception despite having failed to comply with 
the requirements of Utah Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b) within a reasonable time of his 
awareness of his duty to comply with Utah law? 
Mr. Pruitt raised the impossibility exception in paragraph 25 of his 
Complaint, R. 56, as well as in his Memorandum in Support of Rule 59(e) Motion. 
R. 159-62. 
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Mr. Pruitt bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence 
that he complied with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b), including 
filing a paternity action and a notice of commencement of a paternity action with the Utah 
Registrar of Vital Statistics, within a reasonable time of it becoming possible for him to 
do so. Betran v. Allen, 926 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Although the district 
court found that "[n]o evidence was presented that plaintiff has filed a notice of 
commencement of paternity proceedings with the state registry at any time[,]" R. 175, the 
district court never addressed the issue of impossibility. The district court's 
determination that Mr. Pruitt never filed a notice of paternity7 is a finding of fact that this 
Court should not set aside unless it finds it clearly erroneous. Reliance Insurance Co. v. 
Utah Dep't of Tramp., 858 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 1993) (Appellate courts give 
"deference to the trial court's findings of fact, and we will not set them aside unless we 
find them to be clearly erroneous."). 
4. If the "impossibility" exception has not been abrogated, did 
Mr. Pruitt prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was not possible, through 
no fault of his own, for him to comply with Utah law? 
Mr. Pruitt raised the impossibility exception in paragraph 25 of his 
Complaint R. 56, as well as in his Memorandum in Support of Rule 59(e) Motion. 
R. 159-62. 
3 
Mr. Pruitt bore the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that, 
through no fault of his own, it was not possible for him to file a paternity action and a 
notice of commencement of a paternity action within the specified period. Betran v. 
Allen, 926 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Once again the district court never 
reached this i^ sue because it found that Mr. Pruitt had surrendered his legal interest in the 
child by not complying with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-30-4.15(4) and 
78-30-4.14(2)(b). 
However, this Court can determine as a matter of law that Mr. Pruitt did not 
show impossibility and lack of fault based on the undisputed fact that he received notice 
of the expected time and place of the birth and of the birth mother's plan to place the child 
for adoption through the Adoption Center three weeks prior to the birth of the child. The 
district court's finding that Mr. Pruitt had actual knowledge of the birth mother's 
relocation to Utah, knew of her plan to place the child for adoption, and obtained advice 
from a Utah attorney of what he was required to do under Utah law, R. 201, should not be 
disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Reliance Insurance, 858 P.2d at 1366. 
5. Did the trial court err by not granting Mr. Pruitt leave to amend 
his Complaint after the motion to dismiss had been granted and where Mr. Pruitt 
did not file a motion for leave to amend? 
Although Mr. Pruitt argued that the district court should have provided him 
with notice of deficiencies and an opportunity to amend his Complaint, R. 163, he did not 
4 
move the Court for leave to amend his Complaint. Because Mr. Pruitt failed to file a 
motion to amend he failed to properly preserve the issue with the district court or explain 
why this Court should, nevertheless, address the issue. 
The grant or denial of leave to amend a pleading is within the broad 
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of 
discretion. Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, ^ 31, 84 P.3d 1154, 
citing R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., 936 P.2d 1068, 1080 (Utah 1997). 
6. Did the trial court err by denying Mr. Pruitt's Motion for Order 
Under Rule 56(f) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and his Motion for Enlargement 
of Time to Respond as moot after granting Adoption Center's Motion to Dismiss, 
and, if so, was this error harmless? 
Mr. Pruitt raised this question in his Memorandum in Support of Rule 59(e) 
Motion. R.158 
"[A] trial court's decision to grant or deny a rule 56(f) motion is reviewed 
under the abuse of discretion standard. 'Under this standard, [the appellate court] will not 
ie\ erse unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability.'" Campbell, Maack & 
Sessions v Debry, 38 P.3d 984, 988 (Utah 1994), quoting CrosslandSav. v. Hatch, 877 
P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted). A trial court's denial of a motion for 
enlargement of time is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. Utah R. Civ. P. 6(b) Cw[T]he 
court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion . . . (2) upon motion made after the 
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expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was 
the result of excusable neglect. . . ") (emphasis added). 
If the Court concludes that the district court erred in denying Mr. Pruitt's 
motions as moot, the question becomes whether the error was harmless. Harmless error is 
one that is ''sufficiently inconsequential that. . . there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 
817 P.2d 789, 797 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12. Rights and responsibilities of parties in adoption 
proceedings. 
(1) The Legislature finds that the rights and interests of all parties affected 
by an adoption proceeding by an adoption proceeding must be considered and balanced in 
determining what constitutional protections and processes are necessary and appropriate. 
(2) The Legislature finds that: 
(a) the state has a compelling interest in providing stable and 
permanent homes for adoptive for adoptive children in a prompt 
manner, in preventing the disruption of adoptive placements, and in 
holding parents accountable for meeting the needs of children; 
(b) an unmarried mother, faced with the responsibility of making 
crucial decisions about the future of a newborn child, is entitled to 
privacy, and has the right to make timely and appropriate decisions 
regarding her future and the future of the child, and is entitled to 
assurance regarding the permanence of an adoptive placement; 
(c) adoptive children have a right to permanence and stability in 
adoptive placements; 
(d) adoptive parents have a constitutionally protected liberty and 
privacy interest in retaining custody of an adopted child; and 
(e) an unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that 
acquires constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a 
timely and full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood, 
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both during pregnancy and upon the child's birth. The state has a 
compelling interest in requiring unmarried biological fathers to 
demonstrate that commitment by providing appropriate medical care 
and financial support and by establishing legal paternity, in 
accordance with the requirements of this chapter. 
(3) (a) In enacting Sections 78-30-4.11 through 78-30-4.21, the 
Legislature prescribes the conditions for determining whether an 
unmarried biological father's action is sufficiently prompt and 
substantial to require constitutional protection. 
(b) If an unmarried biological father fails to grasp the opportunities 
to establish a relationship with his child that are available to him, his 
biological parental interest may be lost entirely, or greatly 
diminished in constitutional significance by his failure to timely 
exercise it, or by his failure to strictly comply with the available legal 
steps to substantiate it. 
(c) A certain degree of finality is necessary in order to facilitate the 
state's compelling interest. The Legislature finds that the interests of 
the state, the mother, the child, and the adoptive parents described in 
this section outweigh the interest of an unmarried biological father 
who does not timely grasp the opportunity to establish and 
demonstrate a relationship with his child in accordance with the 
requirements of this chapter. 
(d) An unmarried biological father is presumed to know that the 
child may be adopted without his consent unless he strictly complies 
with the provisions of this chapter, manifests a prompt and full 
commitment to this parental responsibilities, and establishes 
paternity. 
(4) The Legislature finds that an unmarried mother has a right of privacy 
with regard to her pregnancy and adoption plan, and therefore has no legal 
obligation to disclose the identity of an unmarried biological father prior to 
or during an adoption proceeding, and has no obligation to volunteer 
information to the court with respect to the father. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.13. Notice of adoption proceedings. 
(1) An unmarried biological father, by virtue of the fact that he has 
engaged in a sexual relationship with a woman, is deemed to be on notice 
that a pregnancy and an adoption proceeding regarding that child may 
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occur, and has a duty to actual notice of a birth or an adoption proceeding 
with regard to that child only as provided in this section. 
* * * 
(3) (a) In order to preserve any right to notice and consent, an unmarried 
biological father may initiate proceedings to establish paternity under 
Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on Paternity, and file a notice of the 
initiation of those proceedings withe the state registrar or vital statistics 
within the Department of Health prior to the mother's execution of consent 
of her relinquishment to an agency. That action and notice may also be 
filed prior to a child's birth. 
* * * 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14. Necessary consent to adoption or relinquishment for 
adoption. 
(1) Either relinquishment for adoption to a licensed child placing agency 
or consent to adoption is required from: 
* * * 
(f) an unmarried biological father on an adoptee, as defined in 
Section 78-30-4.11, only if the requirements and conditions of 
Subsection (2)(a) or (b) have been proven; 
* * * 
(2) In accordance with Subsection (1), the consent of an unmarried 
biological father is necessary only if the father has strictly complied with 
the requirements of this section. 
* * * 
(b) With regard to a child who is under six months of age at the 
time he is placed with adoptive parents, an unmarried biological 
father shall have manifested a full commitment to his parental 
responsibilities by performing all of the acts described in this 
subsection prior to the time the mother executes her consent for 
adoption or relinquishes the child to a licensed child-placing agency. 
The father shall: 
(i) initiate proceedings to establish paternity under Title 78, 
Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on Paternity, and file with that 
court a sworn affidavit stating that he is fulling able and 
willing to have full custody of the child, setting forth his plans 
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for care of the child, and agreeing to a court order of child 
support and the payment of expenses incurred in connection 
with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth; 
(ii) file notice of the commencement of paternity 
proceedings with the state registrar of vital statistics within 
the Department of Health, in a confidential registry 
established by the department for that purpose, which notice 
is considered filed when the notice is entered in the registry of 
notices from unmarried biological fathers; and 
(iii) if he had actual knowledge of the pregnancy, paid a fair 
and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred in connection 
with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth, in 
accordance with his means, and when not prevented from 
doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful 
custody of the child. 
* * * 
(4) If there is no showing that an unmarried biological father has 
consented to or waived his rights regarding a proposed adoption, the 
petitioner shall file with the court a certificate from the state registrar of 
vital statistics within the Department of Health, stating that a diligent search 
has been made of the registry of notices from unmarried biological fathers 
described in Subsection (2)(b)(ii), and that no filing has been found 
pertaining to the father of the child in question, or if a filing is found, 
stating the name of the putative father and the time and date of filing. That 
certificate shall be filed with the court prior to entrance of a final decree of 
adoption. 
(5) An unmarried biological father who does not fully and strictly comply 
with each of the conditions provided in this section, is deemed to have 
waived and surrendered any rights in relation to the child, including the 
right to notice of an> judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of 
the child, and his consent to the adoption of the child is not required. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15. Responsibility of each party for own action-Fraud or 
misrepresentation-Statutory compliance. 
(1) Each parent of a child conceived or born outside of marriage is 
responsible for his or her own actions and is not excused from strict 
compliance with the provisions of this chapter based upon any action, 
statement, or omission of the other parent or third parties. 
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* * * 
(4) The Legislature finds that an unmarried biological father who resides 
in another state may not, in every circumstance, be reasonably presumed to 
know of, and strictly comply with, the requirements of this chapter. 
Therefore when all of the following requirements have been met, that 
unmarried biological father may contest an adoption, prior to finalization of 
the decree of adoption, and assert his interest in the child; the court may 
then, in its discretion, proceed with an evidentiary hearing under Subsection 
78-30-4.16(2): 
(a) the unmarried biological father resides and has resided in 
another state where the unmarried mother was also located or 
resided; 
(b) the mother left the state without notifying or informing the 
unmarried biological father that she could be located in the state of 
Utah; 
(c) the unmarried biological father has, through every reasonable 
means, attempted to locate the mother but does not know or have 
reason to know that the mother is residing in the state of Utah; and 
(d) the unmarried biological father has complied with the most 
stringent and complete requirements of the state where the mother 
previously resided or was located, in order to protect and preserve 
his parental interest and right in the child in cases of adoption. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the 
District Court 
This case involves an appeal of a nonresident unmarried biological father 
from an order of the Fourth Judicial District Court ruling that he waived and surrendered 
his legal interest to a child, adopted by John and Jane Doe, by failing to establish paternity 
according to Utah law. R. 175. At the time of the child's birth on November 12, 2002, 
and the birth mother's relinquishment two days later, the unmarried biological father, 
Buddy Pruitt, was incarcerated at a state prison in Alabama. R. 179, 180. On 
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May 27, 2003, more than seven months after the child was born and placed for adoption, 
and a week after the adoption had been finalized, Mr. Pruitt filed his Civil Complaint for 
Child Custody of Infant Child pro se accompanied by a Motion for Order to Show Cause 
and Temporary Restraining Order, requesting that the court enjoin the adoption 
proceeding that had already occurred. R. 62. The district court denied Mr. Pruitt's 
request for a temporary restraining order on June 6, 2003. R. 68. 
The Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. ("Adoption Center"), the Utah-
licensed child placing agency that placed the child for adoption, filed a motion to dismiss 
on June 9, 2003. R. 69-91. Having failed to submit a timely response, Mr. Pruitt filed a 
Motion for Enlargement to Respond on July 1, 2003. R. 95. The same day, Mr. Pruitt 
also filed a Motion for Order Under Rule 56 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requesting 
additional time to seek discovery in support of his claims. R. 99-100. 
On August 27, 2003, the district judge assigned to the case, Judge Stott, 
granted the Adoption Center's motion to dismiss. R. 134-36. The district court found 
that Mr. Pruitt had "done nothing to comply with the laws of Utah as a natural father 
claiming a paternity interest in a child born in this state, knowing the name of the natural 
mother, and the participation and name of the adoption agency in Utah." R. 135. On the 
following day, presumably because of an administrative mixup, Judge Laycock also 
entered a ruling in this case reaching the same conclusion. R. 137-43. An Order of 
Dismissal with Prejudice was entered on September 22, 2003. R. 182-83. 
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Dissatisfied with the court's ruling, Mr. Pruitt filed a Rule 59(e) Motion on 
September 19, 2003. R. 148. On December 17, 2003, the district court denied this 
motion and ruled that 
Plaintiff has not provided a sufficient basis 
upon which the Court may justify any alteration, 
amendment or dismissal of the Court's 
August 27, 2003 judgment. The undisputed 
facts demonstrate that Mr. Pruitt did not 
perform the steps required under Utah law to 
establish rights to the child at issue. Nothing in 
Mr. Pruitt's Rule 59(e) Motion indicates 
otherwise. 
R. 203. The Order denying the Rule 59(e) motion was signed January 13, 2004. 
R. 206-14. 
Mr. Pruitt filed his notice of appeal on January 14, 2004. R. 215-16. 
II. Statement of Facts. 
Mr. Pruitt claims to be the father of a child born to Lisa Sadler on or about 
November 22, 2002. R. 60. Mr. Pruitt first learned of the pregnancy on or about 
March 26, 2002. R. 59. Just prior to that, on March 22, 2002, Mr. Pruitt was sentenced 
on a felon) conviction to the Alabama State Prison for 22 months. R. 59. 
On October 18. 2002, Mr. Pruitt received notice from The Adoption Center 
of Choice (the "Adoption Center") that Ms. Sadler intended to place the child for 
adoption in Utah. R. 44, 59. Mr. Pruitt called the Adoption Center on or about 
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October 25, 2002, and told a social worker, Annette Monson, he would not consent to the 
adoption. R. 59. 
In an affidavit prepared shortly after this conversation with Mr. Pruitt, Ms. 
Monson indicated she told Mr. Pruitt, among other things, that 
Lisa was now residing in Utah and that the adoption would be 
proceeding according to Utah law. I told him that, if he had 
concerns about the adoption, he needed to consult with an 
attorney in Utah regarding his rights. I explained that I could 
not advise him of his legal rights in Utah as I was not an 
attorney and that he would need to address his rights through 
Utah law if he had any objections. 
R. 78. 
On or about October 31, 2002, Mr. Pruitt mailed to Fourth District Court an 
Answer, Objection and Denial of Consent to Adoption of Unborn Child. R. 39-43. This 
document was returned to Mr. Pruitt by the district court because the district court had no 
record of a case in which the document could be filed. R. 43. 
Mr. Pruitt also wrote to a law firm in Provo, Utah, seeking representation. 
He received a letter dated November 4, 2002, from Mark F. Robinson of Robinson, Seiler 
& Glazier, P.C., informing him that u[t]o preserve whatever rights you may have, you will 
need to proceed immediately to file a paternity action and assert the parental rights with 
the Department of Health/' R. 20. Mr. Pruitt attached this letter to his Complaint. R. 20. 
The child was born November 12, 2002, long after Mr. Pruitt knew Ms. 
Sadler was in Utah, and Ms. Sadler relinquished the child to the Adoption Center on 
13 
November 14, 2002, for placement for adoption. R. 75-76. Ms. Sadler stated in her 
Relinquishment that she was not married to the father of the child. R. 76, 
The Adoption Center obtained a certificate dated November 15, 2002, 
indicating that as of that date no one had filed a notice of the initiation of paternity 
proceedings with the State Registrar of Vital Statistics regarding Ms. Sadler's child. 
R. 73. 
On December 12, 2002, Mr. Pruitt filed a '^Putative Father Intent to Claim 
Paternity" with the Alabama Department of Human Resources. R. 178. 
John and Jane Doe finalized the adoption of the child on May 20, 2003. See 
R. 117. 
A week later and more than seven months after the child had been born and 
placed for adoption, on May 27, 2003, Mr. Pruitt filed the Complaint in this action. 
R. 62. Importantly, the Complaint does not state that Mr. Pruitt is fully able and willing 
to have full custody of the child, nor does he agree to a court order of child support or of 
the payment of expenses incurred by Ms. Sadler during her pregnancy and birth of the 
child. R. 54-62. The only thing Mr. Pruitt says is that he wants the Court to award 
custody of the child to his brother and sister-in-law. R. 56. The Complaint also is not a 
complaint for paternity under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-l et seq. 
Subsequent to the filing of the Complaint in this action, Adoption Center 
obtained a second Certificate of Search For Notice of the Initiation of Proceedings to 
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Establish Paternity, indicating that as of June 4, 2003, neither Mr. Pruitt nor anyone else 
had filed a notice of the initiation of paternity proceedings with the State Registrar of 
Vital Statistics. R. 71. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Pruitt did not establish any rights to the child because he did not 
comply with requirements of Utah law for unmarried biological fathers of children under 
six months of age placed for adoption that are found in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4.14(2)(b), and because he did not satisfying all of the elements of the exception 
from these requirements for nonresident unmarried biological fathers found in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4). In particular, because he had notice, several weeks prior to the 
child's birth that the birth mother planned to place the child through a Utah adoption 
agency but he failed to file a paternity action in Utah regarding the child and failed to file 
a notice of the initiation of a paternity action with the Utah State Registrar of Vital 
Statistics, he failed to establish a legal interest in the child. Because Mr. Pruitt does not 
ha\ e a legal interest in the child, he has no standing to seek custody of or to challenge the 
adoption of the child. 
Mr. Pruitt claims entitlement to the judicially-created "impossibility" 
exception to the statutory requirements for establishing paternity rights under the 
Adoption Code, but that impossibility except was abrogated by the passage of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-30-4.14(2)(b) and 78-30-4.15(4). It is no longer available. 
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If the Court concludes the impossibility except lives on, Mr. Pruitt does not 
qualify for it because, assuming it was impossible for him to comply with the strict 
requirements of the Adoption Code prior to the birth mother's relinquishment of the child, 
he nevertheless failed to comply within a reasonable time after he became aware of those 
requirements. Mr. Pruitt has never filed a paternity action or a notice of paternity action 
with the Utah State Registrar of Vital Statistics, even though he admits he was aware of 
this requirement no later than February, 2003. Brief of Appellant at 6. Because Mr. 
Pruitt was aware weeks before the child was born that the adoption would occur in Utah, 
R. 44, 59, 78, and he was even informed by an Utah attorney that he needed to 
immediately file a paternity action and a notice of that action with the Department of 
Health, R. 20, Mr. Pruitt cannot show that, through no fault of his own, it was not 
possible for him to file a paternity action and a notice of that action within the specified 
period. 
Mr. Pruitt's attempts to protract the litigation in this case are futile and 
contrary to the state's compelling interest of achieving finality in an adoption. Mr. 
Pruitt's argument that he should have been given the opportunity to amend his Complaint 
lacks merit because he did not file a motion in the district court seeking leave to amend 
and he gives no grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the district court. 
Mr. Pruitt also fails to demonstrate that he could present a legally valid claim if given the 
opportunity to amend. Likewise, Mr. Pruitt's motions for additional time to respond to 
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the motion to dismiss and for additional discovery under Rule 56(f) would not have 
helped Mr. Pruitt even if the district court had addressed them before dismissing Mr. 
Pruitf s case. Because it is undisputed that Mr. Pruitt did not establish a legal interest in 
the child under Utah law, any error that the district court might have made with regard to 
these motions was harmless error. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. PRUITT DID NOT ESTABLISH ANY LEGALLY 
RECOGNIZED INTEREST IN THE CHILD AND HE, THEREFORE, 
LACKS STANDING TO SEEK CUSTODY OF THE CHILD OR 
CHALLENGE THE ADOPTION. 
Utah law clearly defines the interest that an unmarried biological father has 
in a child, the relationship between his interest and the state's interest, and the steps an 
unmarried biological father must take to ensure that his interest is accorded legal 
protection. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2)(e), 
an unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that 
acquires constitutional protection only when he demonstrates 
a timely and full commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood, both during pregnancy and upon the child's birth. 
The state has a compelling interest in requiring unmarried 
biological fathers to demonstrate that commitment by 
providing appropriate medical care and financial support and 
by establishing legal paternity, in accordance with the 
requirements of [Sections 78-30-4.11 through 78-30-4.21 of 
the Adoption Code]. 
(Emphasis added). 
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In these sections, the Utah Legislature specifically ''prescribes the 
conditions for determining whether an unmarried biological father's action is sufficiently 
prompt and substantial to require constitutional protection." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4.12(3)(a). An unmarried biological father's ''interest may be lost entirely, or 
greatl) diminished in constitutional significance by his failure to timely exercise it, or by 
his failure to strictly comply with the available legal steps to substantiate it." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-30-4.12(3)(b). Moreover, "the Legislature finds that the interests in the state, 
the mother, the child, and the adoptive parents . . . outweigh the interests of an unmarried 
biological father who does not timely grasp the opportunity to establish and demonstrate a 
relationship with his child in accordance with the requirements" of the Adoption Code. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(3)(c); see also Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248, 251, 
103 S. Ct. 2985. 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) ("The legitimate state interest in facilitating the 
adoption of young children and having the adoption proceeding completed expeditiously 
that underlie the entire statutory scheme also justify a trial judge's determination to 
require all interested parties to adhere precisely to the procedural requirements of the 
statute."). 
The Utah Adoption Code repeatedly emphasizes that an unmarried 
biological father bears the burden of demonstrating that he has strictly complied with its 
provisions to establish paternity. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(3)(d) clarifies that "[a]n 
unmarried biological father has the primary responsibility to protect his rights." 
(Emphasis added). He is ""responsible for his own actions and is not excused from strict 
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compliance with the provisions of this chapter based upon any action, statement, or 
omission of the other parent or third parties." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(1) (emphasis 
added). Moreover, he is "presumed to know that the child may be adopted without his 
consent unless he strictly complies with the provisions of this chapter, manifests a prompt 
and full commitment to his parental responsibilities, and establishes paternity." Utah 
Code Ann. §78-30-4.12(3)(e). 
A nonresident unmarried biological father is excused from strictly 
complying with the requirements of Utah law, but only where "all of the following 
requirements have been met. . . :" 
(a) the unmarried biological father resides and has resided in 
another state where the unmarried mother was also located or 
resided; 
(b) the mother left that state without notifying or informing 
the unmarried biological father that she could be located in 
the state of Utah; 
(c) the unmarried biological father has, through every 
reasonable means, attempted to locate the mother but does not 
know or have reason to know that the mother is residing in 
the state of Utah, and 
(d) the unmarried biological father has complied with the 
most stringent and complete requirements of the state where 
the mother previously resided or was located, in order to 
protect and preserve his parental interest and right in the child 
in cases of adoption. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4) (emphasis added). 
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Because Mr. Pruitt knew that the mother was residing in the state of Utah 
more than three weeks prior to the child's birth, however, Mr. Pruitt was not excused 
from strictly complying with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b). 
Regardless of whether Mr. Pruitt met any of the other elements of § 78-30-4.15(4), it is 
uncontested that he received a letter from the Adoption Center on October 18, 2002, 
informing him that Ms. Sadler believed he was the biological father of the child, and that 
she intended to place her child for adoption through the Adoption Center, a Utah child 
placing agency. R. 44, 59. When Mr. Pruitt telephoned the Adoption Center on or about 
October 23, 2002, moreover, Ms. Monson told him that Ms. Sadler planned to place her 
child in Utah and that he should obtain a Utah attorney if he wished to contest the 
adoption. R. 78. Mr. Pruitt's letter to the Fourth District Court received on 
November 13, 2002, confirms that Ms. Monson had informed him that he uneed[ed] to 
obtain an attorney in the state of Utah" to challenge the adoption proceedings. R. 37 
(backside of page). 
Furthermore, as Judge Laycock concluded, the Answer, Objection and 
Denial of Consent to Adoption of Unborn Child that Mr. Pruitt mailed to the Fourth 
District Court for the State of Utah on October 31, 2002, demonstrates that he "was aware 
of the adoption and was aware of his responsibility to adhere to proper legal procedures to 
establish his paternal rights to the child according to Utah law." R. 140. These facts are 
not disputed, and Mr. Pruitt admits that he knew "Ms. Sadler was living in Utah . . . three 
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weeks prior to his child's birth and relinquishment to the Agency by Ms. Sadler." R. 159 
(emphasis in original). Because Mr. Pruitt was aware in October, 2002, several weeks 
before the child was born on November 12, 2002, that Ms. Sadler had traveled to Utah to 
place her child for adoption there, Mr. Pruitt is not excused from strict compliance with 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b). See In re Adoption ofB.B.D., 1999 UT 70, ^ 17, 
984 P.2d 967 (Nonresident unmarried biological father who knew mother was pregnant, 
knew she had moved to Utah to deliver, and knew she was going to place the child for 
adoption, but who failed to establish paternity according to Utah's law waived right to 
notice and consent regarding adoption). 
Even if Mr. Pruitt had met all of the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4.15(4), he failed to bring this action to contest the adoption within the specified 
time period. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4) provides that a nonresident unmarried 
biological father who has met all of its requirements "may contest an adoption, prior to 
final ization of the decree of adoption^ (Emphasis added). The adoption of the child 
Mr. Pruitt seeks to challenge was finalized on May 20. 2003, more than six months after 
the child was placed with the adoptive family. Mr. Pruitt filed his Complaint in the 
current action seven days later, on May 27, 2003. See R. 62. Because Mr. Pruitt filed 
his Complaint after the adoption was finalized, he cannot contest the adoption under Utah 
Code Ann. §78-30-4.15(4). 
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Thus, Mr. Pruitt is required to demonstrate strict compliance with Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b) to have any legally protectable interest in the child, even 
though he is a nonresident. See Osborne v. Adoption Center of Choice, 2003 UT 15, ^  35, 
70 P.3d 58. This section requires that, "[w]ith regard to a child who is under six months 
of age at the time he is placed with adoptive parents," an unmarried biological father must 
do all of the following uprior to the time the mother executes her consent for adoption or 
relinquishes the child to a licensed child-placing agency:" (1) initiate proceeding to 
establish paternity pursuant to the Uniform Act on Paternity, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-l 
et seq., accompanied by a sworn affidavit manifesting his commitment to his parental 
responsibilities; (2) file a notice of commencement of paternity proceedings with the state 
registrar of vital statistics of the Department of Health; and (3) pay "a fair and reasonable 
amount of the expenses incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy and the 
child's birth[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(i-iii). 
Mr. Pruitt has not complied with any of the requirements of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b). Brief of Appellant at 7 ("The record clearly shows that Mr. 
Pruitt has never disputed the fact that he didn't comply with 78-30-4.14 (Utah)") 
(emphasis in original). Although Mr. Pruitt filed a Complaint seeking custody seven 
months after the placement of the child, he never initiated a proceeding pursuant to the 
Uniform Act on Paternity, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-l et seq., prior to the birth mother's 
relinquishment as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-14.4(2)(b)(i). The Complaint in 
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this action does not comply with the requirements of § 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(i) that it be 
accompanied by a sworn affidavit that Mr. Pruitt "is fully able and willing to have full 
custody of the child." Indeed, the Complaint asks that custody be awarded to his brother 
and sister-in-law. R. 56. 
Mr. Pruitt was also required to file a notice of commencement of paternity 
action with the Utah registrar of vital statistics prior to the birth mother's relinquishment, 
but there is no evidence he has ever filed such a notice. Searches of the Utah registry on 
November 15, 2002, and June 4, 2003, show that no notices have been filed by Mr. Pruitt. 
R. 71, 73. Finally, Mr. Pruitt has never shown that he has paid a fair and reasonable 
amount of the expenses of the pregnancy and child birth in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(iii) or that he was unable or prevented from doing so. 
Mr. Pruitt's failure to meet any one of these requirements defeats any claim 
that he has a legal interest in the child. Because Mr. Pruitt failed to "fully and strictly 
comply," he is "deemed to have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the 
child . . . and his consent to the adoption of the child is not required." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4.14(5). As the Utah Supreme Court held regarding the birth father in Osborne, 
Mr. Pruitt did not "establish a legally recognized relationship with the child whose 
adoption he intends to interrupt." 2003 UT 15, U 34, 70 P.3d 58. He has not uplaced 
himself in the position where Utah courts [can] recognize him as an interested individual 
with rights to challenge an adoption proceeding." Id. He simply lacks any standing to 
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seek custody of the child or to challenge an adoption, and the district court should be 
affirmed. 
II. THE "IMPOSSIBILITY" EXCEPTION MR. PRUITT SEEKS TO 
INVOKE HAS BEEN ABROGATED BY STATUTE 
The impossibility exception to an unmarried biological father's obligation 
to file notice of paternity was narrowly crafted to apply only in unusual circumstances 
where the statute's application deprived a biological father of due process. In Ellis v. 
Social Services Department of the Church Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 615 P.2d 
1250, 1255-56 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
Utah statute barring a subsequent action to establish a putative father's paternity where 
the nonresident father failed to timely file such notice according to the requirements of 
Utah law. Notably, the statute at issue in Ellis, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3) (1980), 
applied to both resident and nonresident fathers and there was no separate provision in 
Utah's statutory scheme at the time, like there is now, that granted an exception to a 
nonresident putative father who was unaware that the birth mother had traveled to Utah to 
place a child without his knowledge. Consequently, out of concern for the putative 
father's due process rights, the court announced the following impossibility exception to 
the filing requirement: 
In the usual case, the putative father would either know or 
reasonable should know approximately when and where his 
child was born. It is conceivable, however, that a situation 
ma}' arise when it is impossible for the father to file the 
required notice of paternity prior to the statutory bar, through 
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no fault of his own. In such a case, due process requires that 
he be permitted to show that he was not afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to comply with the statute. 
Ellis, 615 P.2d at 1256. In addition to showing impossibility and absence of fault, the 
putative father must come forward "within a reasonable time after the baby's birth" and 
comply with the statute. Id. at 1256. 
In Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984), the 
Utah Supreme Court emphasized the narrow scope of the impossibility exception when it 
overturned a district court decision that had granted custody of a child to the father on 
grounds that the filing requirement could not be constitutionally applied to him. The 
court wTote: 
The state has a strong interest in speedily identifying those 
persons who will assume the parental role over such children, 
not just to assure immediate and continued physical care but 
also to facilitate early and uninterrupted bonding of a child to 
its parents. The state must therefore have legal means to 
ascertain within a very short time of birth whether the 
biological parents (or either of them) are going to assert their 
constitutional rights and fulfill their corresponding 
responsibilities or whether adoptive parents must be 
substituted. 
681 P.2d at 203 (emphasis added). In balancing the state's interest with that of the 
putative father, the court held that the father is not entitled to argue that he was denied a 
reasonable opportunity to file the required notice until he first demonstrates that it was 
impossible for him to file through no fault of his own. Id. at 208. The court reasoned that 
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a rule to the contrary would frustrate "the state's purpose to facilitate secure adoptions b\ 
earl)' clarification of status/' Id. at 208. 
The scope of the impossibility exception was further narrowed by 
legislative enactment. In 1990, the Legislature revised several sections of the Utah 
Adoption Code to "resolve the differences between United States Supreme Court and 
Utah Supreme Court decisions and Utah's adoption statute, especially those regarding 
putative fathers." In re Adoption ofW, 904 P.2d 1113, 1118 (Utah Ct. App 1995), citing 
Tape of Utah House Floor Debates, 48th Legislature, January 15, 1990. As a result, the 
Legislature "repealed the former section 78-30-4 registration requirement and replaced it 
with sections 78-30-1.5 and 78-30-4.1 to-4.10[.]" Id at 1118. Of particular importance 
is Section 78-30-4.8, in which the legislature codified the impossibility exception and 
defined "ten days" as the '"reasonable' time period described in Ellis for the putative 
father to file his notice of paternity when the other two conditions are met." Id. at 1119. 
In two subsequent cases, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the constitutional application 
of § 78-30-4.8. In re Adoption ofW, 904 P.2d at 1121; Betran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892, 
897-98 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (applying law as it read in 1994). 
In 1995 the Utah Legislature again reconsidered the interests of putative 
fathers and carefully crafted a statutory scheme that fully addresses the constitutional 
interests of putative fathers without the need for a judicially created impossibility 
exception. It repealed numerous sections of the Adoption Code, including § 78-30-4.8, 
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and replaced them with new sections that define how a putative father's interest in a child 
acquires constitutional protection. 
First, § 78-30-4.12 clarifies how the interests of the unmarried biological 
father are balanced against the interests of the state, the mother, the child, and the 
adoptive parents and creates the presumption that an unmarried biological child knows 
that a child may be adopted without his consent unless he meets the requirements of the 
Adoption Code. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(3)(c), (e). 
Second, § 78-30-4.13(1) redefines the notice to which an unmarried 
biological father of a child is entitled: 
An unmarried biological father, by virtue of the fact that he 
has engaged in a sexual relationship with a woman, is 
deemed to be on notice that a pregnancy and an adoption 
proceeding regarding that child may occur, and has a duty to 
protect his own rights and interests. He is therefore entitled 
to actual notice of a birth or an adoption proceeding with 
regard to that child only as provided in this section. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Third, § 78-30-4.14 clarifies that an unmarried biological father waives or 
surrenders his rights in relation to the child if he does not fully and strictly comply with 
enumerated requirements, as explained above, supra pp. 20-22, which differ depending 
on whether the child is placed for adoption before or after the child reaches six months of 
age. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2), (5). 
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Fourth, the Legislature determined that an unmarried biological father is 
required to strictly comply with these requirements regardless of whether he is misled by 
the birth mother or a third party. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(l)-(3). 
Finally, in lieu of the impossibility exception that existed in the repealed 
§ 78-30-4.8, the Legislature, for the first time, created a separate provision for 
nonresident unmarried biological fathers. Section 78-30-4.15(4) provides an exception to 
the strict compliance standard for nonresident unmarried biological fathers because the 
Legislature found that "an unmarried biological father who resides in another state ma> 
not, in every circumstance, be reasonable presumed to know of, and strictly comply with 
the requirements of this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4). 
Consequently, the requirements of § 78-30-4.15(4) are all that remain of the 
impossibility exception for nonresident unmarried biological fathers.1 Requiring an 
1
 The only published appellate court decision that even mentions the impossibility 
exception under the statutory scheme adopted in 1995 is In re Adoption ofS.L.F., 
2001 UT App. 183, ^ 1 33, 27 P.3d 583 (Davis, J., concurring), where Justice Davis argues 
in his concurrence that the adoption statute violated the putative father's due process 
rights as applied. However, this case was unusual because it involved the effort of the 
child's mother to terminate the resident father's parental rights through a home placement 
with the maternal grandmother. Id. at ^ 10, citing In re K.B.E., 740 P.2d 292, 298-99 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (Jackson, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) 
C'[I]n home placement cases . . . 'there is no need for the state to intervene on behalf of 
the child and cut off the rights of the natural father' to ensure 'uninterrupted bonding of a 
child to its [new adoptive parents],' because the mother continues to fulfill a parental 
role/'). Moreover, the majority only speculated as to the father's due process rights and 
resolved the case purely on statutory grounds . In re Adoption ofS.L.F., 2001 UT App. 
183, c 37, 27 P.3d 583 (Bench, J., concurring). Furthermore, the present argument that 
the new statutory scheme obviates the need for the impossibility exception may not have 
been argued before the court at that time. 
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independent judicial analysis to determine whether a nonresident putative father qualifies 
for the judicially created impossibility exception when the court has already determined 
that the nonresident putative father fails to qualify for the legislatively created exception 
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4) needlessly protracts litigation and undermines the 
state's compelling interest of reaching a prompt resolution in adoption disputes. The 
statutory exception is certainly sufficient to address a nonresident putative father's due 
process concerns. Two separate inquiries to determine whether a nonresident biological 
father was accorded due process is unnecessary and unduly adds to the administrative 
costs to the state and raises the legal costs for adoptive parents. 
This Court can reduce needless litigation in future adoption disputes by 
clarifying that the impossibility exception has been abrogated by the Legislature through 
the adoption of its current statutory scheme. What is left is a straightforward rule that is 
easily applied: a nonresident unmarried biological father must meet the requirements of 
Subsection 78-30-4.15(4) or, alternatively, strictly comply with the requirements of 
Section 78-30-4.14 to have a constitutionally protected interest in the child. Because Mr. 
Pruitt has failed to do either, he has no legally recognized interest in the child and no right 
to seek custody of the child or to challenge the adoption. 
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III. EVEN IF THE IMPOSSIBILITY EXCEPTION IS AVAILABLE, MR. 
PRUITT CANNOT RAISE IT BECAUSE HE FAILED TO COMPLY 
WITH UTAH LAW WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME OF WHEN 
HE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO 
COMPLY 
Assuming arguendo that the impossibility exception still applies to a 
nonresident's compliance with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b), 
Mr. Pruitt is precluded from raising it because he failed to comply with Utah law within a 
reasonable time after even he acknowledges he was able to do so. In cases where the 
courts held that the putative father was entitled to raise the impossibility defense, the 
father complied with the requirement of filing a notice of paternity in Utah within days of 
discovering the birth of the child and/or the mother's intention to place the child. For 
example, in In re Baby Boy Doe, 111 P.2d 686, 688 (Utah 1986), the nonresident putative 
father filed a paternity notice in Utah one day after learning of the birth and placement of 
the child. See also In re K.B.E., 740 P.2d 292, 293 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (affirming the 
ruling of the trial court that the putative father had complied with the statute within a 
reasonable time of being able to do so when he filed his notice of paternity in Utah later 
the same afternoon that the child had been born and the mother and grandfather had filed 
an adoption petition); T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906, 908 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (father 
filed his notice of paternity the day after he learned of the mother's intention to relinquish 
the child via the adoption petition). In reliance on these decisions, the Utah Legislature 
defined the "reasonable time" within which a putative father must comply with the 
30 
paternity filing requirement as ten days. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.8 1990; see also In re 
Adoption ofW, 904 P.2d at 1119. The Utah Court of Appeals upheld this time period. In 
re Adoption ofW, 904 P.2d at 1121; Betran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892. 897-98 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). 
Mr. Pruitt never complied with Utah's statutory requirements. Mr. Pruitt 
learned that the birth mother had traveled to Utah approximately three weeks prior to the 
birth of the child. He never commenced a paternity action as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(i), and he never filed a notice of commencement of any paternity 
action as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(ii), although more than twenty 
months have passed since the child's birth. By his own admission, Mr. Pruitt was aware 
of the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b) as of February 2003. Brief of 
Appellant at 6. Therefore, this Court should have no problem holding that Mr. Pruitt has 
forfeited the right to rely upon the impossibility exception by not complying with the Utah 
statutory7 requirement of initiating an action pursuant to Title 78, Chapter 45a and filing a 
notice commencement of paternity action within a reasonable time of it becoming 
possible for him to do so. 
IV. EVEN IF THE IMPOSSIBILITY EXCEPTION WERE AVAILABLE 
TO MR. PRUITT, HE FAILED TO PROVE THAT IT WAS 
IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO COMPLY THROUGH NO FAULT OF 
HIS OWN 
If the impossibility exception is available, Mr. Pruitt bears the burden of 
"proving] by clear and convincing evidence that, through no fault of his own, it was 
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not possible for him to file a notice of paternity within the specified period..,." 
Betrcrn v. Allen, 926 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added). Mr. Pruitt 
fails to meet his burden of proof, because the record shows that he had sufficient notice of 
the expected time and place of the child's birth as well as the birth mother's intention to 
place the child for adoption, but nevertheless failed to comply with the statutory 
requirements before she relinquished. In Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 
P.2d 199, 202, 207 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court held that the putative father had 
"ample advance notice of the expected time of birth and the fact that the mother intended 
to relinquish the child for adoption" where the putative father's mother learned of the 
birth mother's desire to place the child less than three weeks before the birth and 
placement of the child. In this case, Mr. Pruitt was notified on October 18, 2002, of the 
expected delivery time and of the birth mother's plans to place her child for adoption 
through Adoption Center, and the child was born on November 12, 2002, and 
relinquished by the birth mother on November 14, 2002. R. 44, 59, 142. Thus, Mr. Pruitt 
had almost a month to comply with the requirements of Utah Code by filing a paternity 
action and notice of commencement of that action with the Utah registrar of vital 
statistics. This is more time than the birth father had in Wells. 
Mr. Pruitt's argument that he should be excused from complying with 
Utah's paternity filing requirements because he did not know the proper procedure to 
protect his interest under Utah statute is unfounded. Rejecting a similar argument in 
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Betran, this Court held that "[g]iving actual notice of statutory requirements to putative 
fathers is clearly not constitutionally required." Betran, 926 P.2d at 897-98, citing Lehr v. 
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2995, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (holding no 
violation of due process where putative father was not given special notice, even though 
the court and the mother knew he had filed an action in another court, because father was 
capable of asserting and protecting his own rights); Wells. 681 P.2d at 207. The Utah 
Supreme Court has also rejected a putative father's argument that due process requires 
that he receive actual notice of the statutory requirements for establishing his paternal 
rights. Sanchez v. IDS Social Servs., 680 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1984). 
Because actual notice of the statutory requirements is not constitutionally 
required, Mr. Pruitt's complaint that Adoption Center's agent, Ms. Monson, "never . . . 
statefdj that Mr. Pruitt specifically had to comply with Utah statute" is rendered irrelevant 
regardless of the truth of his assertion. Brief of Appellant at 4. "An adoption agency 
is . . . not legally required to alert the putative father of what he must do to establish his 
rights." Betran, 926 P.2d at 898. Adoption Center's agent went above and beyond what 
was required of her by informing Mr. Pruitt that he should contact a Utah attorney. See 
R. 78. 
Moreover, contrary to Mr. Pruitt's position, he is not excused from meeting 
the requirements of Utah law merely because he is a resident of another state. In Betran, 
which deals with the rights of a nonresident putative father, this Court held that 
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Cw[i]gnorance of the law does not relieve a putative father from having to comply with the 
statutory requirement to register a notice of paternity." Betran, 926 P.2d at 898, citing 
Leh\ 463 U.S. at 264, 103 S.Ct. at 2995. Satisfying the statutory requirements of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4) is the only way nonresident fathers are excused from strictly 
complying with Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2). 
Mr. Pruitt's efforts to obtain legal counsel are not only insufficient to show 
impossibility with the requirements of Utah law, but demonstrate Mr. Pruitt was informed 
of the actions he needed to take to preserve his interest in the child. In Betran, this Court 
held that the putative father was not entitled to a hearing to prove impossibility, despite 
consulting three different California attorneys about stopping the Utah adoption, 
proceeding pro se in his effort to halt the adoption by filing a paternity action in 
California, and informing the child placing agency by letter of his intent to object to the 
adoption and his action in California immediately after receiving notice of the birth 
mother's intent to place the child. Betran, 926 P.2d at 894, 899-900. Likewise, Mr. 
Pruitt's efforts to contact attorneys to represent him and his pro se efforts to contest the 
adoption do not excuse him from complying with the requirements of Utah statute. 
Indeed, Mr. Pruitt was specifically warned by a letter, dated November 4, 2002, written 
by a Utah attorney that he uneed[ed] to proceed immediately to file a paternity action and 
assert the parental rights with the Department of Health" to preserve whatever interest he 
had in the child. R. 20. Thus, Mr. Pruitt not only had actual notice of the expected birth, 
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the plans for adoption, and the fact they would occur in Utah, he even had actual notice 
that he needed to take immediate action by filing a paternity action and notice of that 
action with the Department of Health. These facts defeat any ability to use the 
impossibility exception. 
Although Mr. Pruitt argues that his situation is analogous to that of the 
putative father in In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 111 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986), where the 
Utah Supreme Court held the statute as applied deprived the father of due process, Mr. 
Pruitt's situation is distinguishable for several reasons. In Baby Boy Doe, the putative 
father was aware that the birth mother was in Utah several months prior to the birth of the 
child. However, he traveled to Utah and discussed with the birth mother her plans 
regarding adoption, at which time the mother told the putative father that she would 
forego the adoption plans and move to Arizona with him. Id. at 687. In reliance on her 
promise, the putative father found a job and a place to live in Arizona and was in the 
process of moving there when he learned that the mother had given birth weeks earlier 
than expected and had placed the child for adoption. Id. at 687. Within four days of 
discovering the placement, the father drove to Utah, picked up the birth mother, and 
together they filed a notice of claim to paternity in Utah. Id. at 687-88. 
Whereas the putative father in Baby Boy Doe did not have ample notice 
because the birth mother had told him just days before the child's premature birth that she 
planned to raise the child with him, Mr. Pruitt received a letter from Adoption Center on 
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October 18, 2002, more than three weeks prior to when the child was born and told of the 
expected date of birth and of the birth mother's intentions to place her child with 
Adoption Center. Brief of Appellant at 4. While the putative father in Baby Boy Doe 
took appropriate measures to comply with Utah law by filing a notice of paternity four 
days after learning of the birth and placement of the child, Mr. Pruitt still has not filed a 
paternity action or notice of that action with the Utah state registrar of vital statistics. 
Mr. Pruitt's mistaken assumption that he could preserve his interest in the child by filing a 
notice of paternity in Alabama thirty days after the birth of the child does not absolve him 
of his responsibility to comply with the requirements of Utah law when he was on notice 
that the placement of the child would occur in Utah. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
DENYING MR. PRUITT AN OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND HIS 
COMPLAINT 
The granting or denial of leave to amend a pleading is within the broad 
discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of 
discretion. Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, J^ 31, 84 P.3d 1154, 
citing R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., 936 P.2d 1068, 1080 (Utah 1997). 
This Court should reject Mr. Pruitt's argument that he should be allowed to 
amend his complaint for several reasons. First, Mr. Pruitt did not file a motion in the 
district court to amend his Complaint. 'To properly move for leave to amend a 
complaint, a litigant must file a motion that 'shall be made in writing, shall state with 
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particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought.'" Holmes 
Development, LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, \ 57, 48 P.3d 895, quoting 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1) (citations omitted). Moreover, pursuant to Rule 7(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the motion to amend must be accompanied by a memorandum 
of points and authorities in support and by a proposed amended complaint "so that the 
court can ascertain what changes are sought and can determine whether the motion should 
be granted and whether justice so requires the amendment of a pleading." Id. at % 58, 
citing AT&T Corp. v. American Cash Card Corp., 184 F.R.D. 515. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
Although Mr. Pruitt argued in his Memorandum in Support of Rule 59(e) 
Motion that the trial court "should have provided Mr. Pruitt with notice of deficiencies 
and an oppurtunity [sic] to amend his Complaint" before dismissing it, R. 163, Mr. Pruitt 
never actually moved the district court for permission to amend his Complaint. 
Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in not granting Mr. Pruitt 
leave to amend where no actual motion for leave to amend was filed and where a 
proposed amended complaint was not attached so that the court could determine the 
changes Mr. Pruitt intended to make. Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, 
U 59, 48 P.3d 895; see also Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 Utah App. 339, \ 47, 79 P.3d 974 
C'|T]he court did not have before it a proper motion to amend, so it could not have 
granted the request for leave to amend."). 
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Second, even if district courts were obliged to give provide pro se litigants 
an opportunity to amend sua sponte, there is no deficiency in Mr. Pruitt's Complaint that 
could have been cured by amendment. He has no legal interest in the child. Changing the 
legal theory under which the undisputed facts concerning his failure to establish an 
interest in the child are framed would not have helped Mr. Pruitt, and his argument for 
leave to amend is futile. A district court's discretion is not disturbed where it properly 
determines that the party's attempts to amend would be futile. Grand Canyon 
Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, If 34, 84 P.3d 1154 (affirming trial court's denial of party's 
attempt to amend complaint to add claim that was legally futile); see also Andalex Res., 
Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (A court should deny motions to 
amend ''when the moving party seeks to assert a new claim that is legally insufficient or 
futile."); 77/77/7? v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1389 (Utah 1996) ("Further, a motion to 
amend should not be granted where the pleader does not set forth a legally sufficient 
claim"). Nowhere in the record does Mr. Pruitt set forth a claim that has not already been 
considered and rejected by the court on legal grounds. In his Memorandum in Support of 
Rule 59(e) Motion, Mr. Pruitt argues that his pleading could "be cured by allegations of 
other facts or amendment of [the] Complaint" because he allegedly met the requirements 
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4). R. 163. However, in the same memorandum, Mr. 
Pruitt admits that he knew the birth mother was living in Utah three weeks prior to the 
child's birth and relinquishment, R. 159, thereby defeating the applicability of Utah Code 
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Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4)(c). Consequently, Mr. Pruitt fails to demonstrate any legal basis 
upon which he could possibly prevail if given the opportunity to amend his Complaint. 
Finally, the granting of Mr. Pruitt's belated request at this juncture would 
needlessly undermine the child's and the adoptive parents need for stability in their 
relationship. "Although the amendment of pleadings is sometimes permitted on remand," 
an appellate courts does not base its "examination of the pleadings on the possibility of 
future amendments that a trial court may in its discretion allow or disallow." Richards v 
Baum* 914 P.2d 719, 721 (Utah 1996) (emphasis in original). Moreover, motions to 
amend brought after dismissal of the case are generally denied in the typical civil case. 
See, e g, Tretheway v Furstenau, 2001 UT App. 400, \ 18, 40 P.3d 649. Since adoption 
cases involve more urgency to reach resolution and demand greater finality than the 
typical civil case, belated motions to amend should be viewed with greater skepticism and 
reluctance in contested adoption cases. Indeed, because the state's compelling interest in 
finality outweighs the interest of a putative father who does not timely grasp his 
opportunity to demonstrate compliance with the statutory requirements, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4.12(3)(c), this Court cannot tolerate the delay that a late motion to amend would 
create in this case. 
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VI. EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FULLY 
CONSIDERING MR. PRUITT'S RULE 56(f) MOTION AND HIS 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME, SUCH ERROR WAS 
HARMLESS 
iw[A] trial court's decision to grant or deny a rule 56(f) motion is reviewed 
under the abuse of discretion standard. 'Under this standard, [the appellate court] will not 
reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability.'" Campbell, Maack & 
Sessions v. Debry, 38 P.3d 984, 988 (Utah 1994), quoting CrosslandSav. v. Hatch, 877 
P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted). Among other factors, the trial court 
examines "whether the affidavit supporting a Rule 56(f) motion adequately 'explainfs] 
how the continuance will aid [her] opposition to summary judgment.'" Debry, 38 P.3d at 
989, quoting Callioux v Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Regarding a request for an enlargement of time, Rule 6(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure indicates that a district court has discretion to grant or deny a motion 
for enlargement of time so long as it does not extend the time contrary to the provisions 
elsewhere in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, this Court should review 
the district court's decision with regards to Mr. Pruitt's Motion for Enlargement of Time 
under the abuse of discretion standard as well. 
In this case, the district court denied Mr. Pruitt's Motion for Enlargement of 
Time to Respond and Motion for Order Under Rule 56 as moot after granting Adoption 
Center's Motion to Dismiss. R. 198. Even if the district court abused its discretion by 
not considering the merits of Mr. Pruitt's Motion prior to dismissing the case, the error 
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was harmless and nothing is gained by allowing Mr. Pruitt to pursue those motions at this 
time. 
In his Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond and Motion for Order 
Under Rule 56, Mr. Pruitt argued that (1) he should be granted more time to respond 
because he did not know the response time provided by the rules and because he is a pro 
sc prisoner; and (2) that he should be granted time to conduct discover}' to support his 
case. However, because Mr. Pruitt does not contest the fact that he knew of the birth 
mother's intention to place the child in Utah but failed to file a notice of paternity with 
the Utah registrar of vital statistics prior to her relinquishment of the child, he has no 
legally cognizable interest in the child and, therefore, the additional time and testimony he 
proposes to gather would be fruitless. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(5); Osborne v. 
Adoption Center of Choice, 2003 UT 15, ^  34, 70 P.3d 58. 
Furthermore, Mr. Pruitt's affidavit in support of his Rule 56(f) motion 
failed to adequately explain how the continuance would aid his opposition to dismissal of 
the case. In particular, Mr. Pruitt sought to obtain "affidavits from my family members 
who have personal knowledge of my case and my actions, concerning my articulated 
intent to keep and rear my child" as well as "affidavits from persons here at this 
institution who have personal knowledge of my action, or diligent efforts, that will justify 
m\ opposition to Defendant's Motion." R. 103. However, Adoption Center has never 
disputed Mr. Pruitt's subjective intent and his efforts short of compliance with the 
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statutory requirements of either Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-30-4.14(2)(b) or 78-30-4.15(4). 
because these facts are irrelevant to the disposition of this case. 
Mr. Pruitt also sought testimony from family members and from the birth 
mother to support his claim that the birth mother "abandoned" him during her pregnancy 
and that her family withheld information about her whereabouts and her plans to place the 
child for adoption. R. 103. Once again, regardless of the testimony that Mr. Pruitt could 
procure in support of this position, it would not aid his opposition to the dismissal of the 
case. Certainly, the birth mother had no legal duty to stay in her relationship with Mr. 
Pruitt and he is not excused from strictly complying with Utah law based upon any action, 
statement, or omission by her or her family. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(1) ("Each 
parent of a child conceived or born outside of marriage is responsible for his or her own 
actions and is not excused from strict compliance with the provisions of this chapter 
based upon any action, statement, or omission of the other parent or third parties.")- This 
is particularly the case here where Mr. Pruitt had knowledge from another source, 
Adoption Center, as to the birth mother's whereabouts and her intention to place her child 
for adoption. 
Because the denial of Mr. Pruitt's Motion for Enlargement of Time to 
Respond and Motion for Order Under Rule 56 did not prejudice his case, it is harmless 
error. In essence, the denial of Mr. Pruitt's Motion precluded him from obtaining 
additional evidence to support positions which the district court had already considered 
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and which made no difference in the outcome of the case. The rejection of additional 
evidence that would not have changed the result, if admitted, is harmless error and not 
cause for reversal. Ogden Valley Trout & Resort Co. v. Lewis, 41 Utah 183, 125 P. 687, 
691. Therefore, even if the appellate court finds that the district court erred on a motion 
involving summary judgment, it is required to reverse the district court's decision only if 
a different outcome on the motion "would have had a reasonable probability of affecting 
the outcome of the case." Crookston v Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789, 797 
(Utah 1991). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the district court's ruling that Mr. Pruitt failed to 
comply with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4.14(2)(b) and, consequently, has waived and surrendered any right in relation to 
the child. This Court should also reject Mr. Pruitt's claim that he is entitled to raise the 
impossibility exception. The impossibility exception has been abrogated by statute. If it 
has not been abrogated, Mr. Pruitt is not entitled to raise it because he failed to meet his 
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that, through no fault of his own, it 
was not possible for him to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b) and that he 
complied with the statute within a reasonable time of when it became possible for him to 
do so. 
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This Court should also iv ' . \ anu>^ it> 
discretion ::~ not erantinu Mr. Priiitt leave to amend because Mi. 
i Li ILM\C K) allium Moreover, an}- attempt b\ Mr. Pruiu to amend after th< 
district couu \u\-\ : • . ;. :# iinicl) and would have been • 
futile. . ; 
Finally, the district court, properly denied Mr. Pruitt's motions *,.•• 
• • •>••• . aaanu'iiai discovery under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) because it is 
inidisputed that Mi • *-; *. . .. .. , jcogni/ed lnicreM; in the child. 
The district court should be affirmed m -. expects. 
D ATFD this 26th day of August, 2004. 
\\K M M CRAPO, LLC 
Lari^ 
Attorn eysTor Defendant /'Appellee 
The Adoption Center of Choice 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify this 26th day of August, 2004, that I caused two (2) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE THE ADOPTION CENTER 
OF CHOICE to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Buddy Pruitt 
1337 15TH Avenue S., Apt. 203 
Birmingham, AL 35203 
S U\ PDATA^PLEADINGVADOPTION CENTER PRUITT APPELLEE'S BRIEF wpd 
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ADDENDUM 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC 
Attorneys and Counselors at Law 
Mark F Robtnson 
Thomas W Seller 
David L Glazier 
Jared L Anderson 
Scott L Worthington 
Nathan S Donus 
Ryan T Peel 
November 4, 2002 
Buddy Pruitt 222271 
Limestone Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 66 15-94T 
Capshaw, AL 35742 
Dear Mr. Pruitt: 
Thank you for your informative letter. Unfortunately, the adoption laws of the State of Utah do 
not favor the rights of unmarried biological fathers. To preserve whatever rights you may have, 
you will need to proceed immediately to file a paternity action and assert the parental rights with 
the Department of Health. Given your financial situation and incarceration, you have a most 
difficult challenge. Even if you assert parental rights timely and properly, the best interests of the 
child may permit his adoption. 
1 am unable to assist as requested. Utah Legal Services (Provo) at 455 North University Avenue, 
#100, Provo, Utah, 84601, telephone (801) 374-6766, may be able to help. 
I wish you well in a difficult situation. 
Sincerely, 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC 
MiDCT/Kobinson 
EXHIBIT # to 
80 North 100 East, P O Box 1266, Provo, Utah 84603-1266, Telephone (801) 375-1920, Fax (801) 377-9405 
4TH DISTRICTnCOURT PROVO OEPACT^HT . 
JJlLUlJ/h/02 
ZOflZ MOV J 3 P I 2 - ' 5 3 
*Hu.maurriL juu Ot-uL^Yivuj3X. ^ Orn Own U^yyy^xt^ G_X~ <±JUmju 
yOUC7Ub (loQ^jELcnx^L ^OU^JJXAJJ^ Co^i&fceujJ' ftfl. ^ Jlcaj^ c&rvo^A 
7 ' rrncyrdJlOi- &n Q 3Q rmxytdh /&m)ju/i£Jb Ja? Q ^Uu^ytJ^U QjUOLp -
a n d ^_CCSVUCISLJJL>^ Q akclJjtb^tiin. Orn en QJU^ZAA^J /7&tr/5S 
-ton u>fdcA J M A ^ jamjy^-JTA^-^/Junjcrri ~£yi JU^JJ^/rnJsnDu^ 
-CUHLAJ? / T L O ^ - ^ - U ^ dtbzMJ^Dxpjiri&t jLhJL& U^ rrnM dturf) ,<Lon 
(2Xl±^ ZtJuUJi /7zQ/cJiMjjr> 0- ^Jxcrrna uy*-CuJC "« '/TOO / x o J s ^ l ^ , 
^ & £ UHJJ)Jjyo^ rtrUA&Gn o^Sthjusi Croon ohjdj&.&s+s* 
UJJL 
a A£rO_£iJl UJTJTjfevi >^6W^ c v n ^ ^ t h ^ ^ A ^ J ^ A ^ ^ ^ ^ 0 ^ ^ 
O&€U*ULZ~ rmM OJtX$ Q^UJ stk&i ^~ /rusuy- Jib ow&v^ a^n 
Gy>5/«<j ^ 3T7Y3 
EXHIBIT^ 
:* ' • ' ] < • > ^ ^ 
Adoption 
Centervf Choice 
October 8, 2002 
Buddy Pruitt #222271 
#15—Dorm 94 Top 
PO BOX 66 
Capshaw, AL. 35742-0066 
Dear Mr. Pruitt; 
A client of ours by the name of Lisa Sadler will deliver a baby on or around the 22nd 
day November, 2002. Lisa has informed us you are the father of her child. She is 
planning to place the child for adoption through our agency and she would like to have 
your support in this decision. We have enclosed a document which, when signed will 
terminate any rights or responsibilities you may have for the child. You will need to sign 
this document in front of a Notary Public. If you cannot find a Notary, there is also a 
form to have two witnesses. 
If you have any questions regarding your rights in this matter, you may wish to consult an 
attorney or phone our agency (801) 224-2440. 
Respectfully, 
'4C&> 
Annette Monson SSW 
Social Worker 
Tel 801 224-2440 
Fax 801 224-itfW EXMI9IT fr\ J J IK-
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 NORTH 100 WEST 
PROVO, UT 84601 
Telephone (801) 429-1112 
Dated: / / - 9 ~C " ^ Case No. 
Case Name: 
The Fourth District Court is returning these documents to you for the 
following reasons: 
X They were sent with no case number or an incorrect case number and we 
cannot find any record of the case by name at this site. 
The filing fee of must be submitted with the document. 
OR: 
f)o ca$>c Its led -fiy BuJAh P^dtt 
try- LISCL Sadler [i)e LOoulcA rvCjCd 
n<Xm/ ox 
OOJUI ? 
These corrections will need to be made before the Court can process 
the documents. Thank you. 
EXHl8rr#a(pa3e | «f 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FAMILY COURT DIVISION 
In the matter of the * 
adoption of (unborn child): 
* 
BUDDY PRUITT, as Father, 





LISA SADLER, as Mother, 











ANSWER, OBJECTION AND DENIAL 
OF CONSENT TO ADOPTION OF UNBORN CHILD 
Comes now before this Honorable Court, Buddy Pruitt, in 
the above-styled cause, and hereby, respectfully files h:s 
Answer, Objection and Denial to the Adoption of his unborn 
child, and as grounds heretofore, states as follows: 
1. The mother (Lissa Sadler) is the mother of said 
child and at the time of conception, was a residence of the City 
of Birmingham, County of Jefferson, State of Alabama. The 
mother, at this time resides in the State of Utah (address 
unknown). 
2. The father (Buddy Pruitt) is the father and parent of 
said unborn child and at the time of conception, was a residece 
of the City of Birmingham, County of Jefferson, State of 
Alabama. The father currently resides in this State, at the 
address of Limestone Correctional Facility, P. 0- Box 66, 
[1] 
EXHi8ir#s> (<TY>ar 
Capshaw/ Alabama/ 35742/ and has a projected release date of 
2003. 
3. On October 18, 2002, Objector/Petitioner, received 
notice/ via; U.S. Mail from Adoption Center of Choice concerning 
the adoption of his unborn child/ which/ enclosed Consent to 
Adoption/Birth Father Relinqueshment forms> Requesting that 
Father/ agree to adoption and return said documents to this 
agency that adoption procedures may proceed. Therefore/ having 
it been made known to Objector/Petitioner, that such consent to 
adoption has been initiated by the unborn childfs mother, 
Objecter, hereby/ Answer/ Object to and Deny Adoption of his 
unborn child/ and further, states/ as follows below; 
4. He is not and do not contemplate relinqueshing his 
parental rights nor consent to the adoption of his child/ but/ 
assigns all rights to his child as a father and parent. 
5. At no time has he authorized or intend to aurthorize 
this adoption/ further, do not surrender his rights. Objector 
claims his rights as father and parent of said unborn child. 
6. He has not and does not now consent to the adoption 
of his child. 
7. He has not abandoned and does not intend to abandon 
his child/ parental obligation or parental rights of this child. 
8. I further represent that I am the father of this 
child and do not consent to adoption proceedings. 
9. I do not believe the adoption of my child is in my 
child's best interest. 
i) 0 
Wherefore/ objector/petitioner/ files his answer and 
objection to said adoption/ consent forms, and birth father 
relinquishment forms and respectfully prays that the prayers of 
the adoption be denied; that said adoption be void and 
dismissed; and for such other and further relief as shall be 
proper in the premises. 
Respectfully submitted this the3| day 
of Och>be& ,2002, 
uxj^ylft 
rftfltt #222271 *uddy Pi 
15D-94T 
P. 0. Box 66 
Capshav, Alabama 35742 
Sworn ^ t o and subscribed before me this the ^ ( day 




My Commission Expires 
[3] 0 n n p. / n 
£XW8n~#d (<y=~ n*x<\ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1/ hereby, certify that I have forwarded a copy of the 
foregoing "Answer/ Objection and Denial of Consent to Adoption" 
to the Clerk of the Court/ Utah County Circuit Court/ Family 
Division/ Provo County Courthouse/ Provo, Utah/ 84601/ by 
placing a copy of the same in the U.S. Mail/ postage prepaid on 
t h i s t h e ^ d a y of Ocr/nbeft , 2002. 
JICXAAM. frujudtfe 
Buddy F*ruitt #222 Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. Buddy Pruitt #222271 
241 West 520 North
 p > 0_ B o x 6 6 
Orem, Utah 84057 Capshav, Alabama 35742 
t 4 1
 fif)f,m 
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THE ADOPTION C C ^ o t e P o F CHOICE/ 
JOHN and JANE DOE/ 
(Whose names are unknown) 
DEFENDANTS. 
D'V/s/ON# S" 
CIVIL COMPLAINT FOR CUSTODY 
OF INFANT CHILD 
CASE NO. 
PRO SE 
BUDDY PRUITT AIS # 222271 
LIMESTONE CORR. FACILITY 
28779 NICK DAVIS RD. 
HARVEST AL 35749 
00006 
IN THE 4th DISTRICT 20URT OF UTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
BUDDY PRUITT/ * 
PLAINTIFF/ * 
VS. 
THE ADOPTION C ^ n*/dr O F CHOICE/ CASE NO. 
* 
JOHN and JANE DOE/ 
(Whose names are unknown)/ * 
DEFENDANTS. * 
SUMMONS 
Notice to: ftcSn^on tfniw of CfrfiiCfc. 
This service by certified mail of this Summons is initiated upon 
the written request of the Plaintiff pursuant to the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
The Complaint which is attached to this Summons is important 
and you must take immediate action to protect your rights. The Complaint 
will be filed with the Court within (10) days of service. You are 
required tp mail or hand deliver a copy of a written Answer/ either 
admitting or denying each allegation in the Complaint/ to Buddy Pruitt/ 
Plaintiff/ srhose address is: Buddy Pruitt #222271/ Limestone Corr. 
Facility 15-66B# 28779 Nick Davis RD. / H&£v"est: AL 35749. THIS ANSWER 
MUST BE MAILED OR DELIVERED WITHIN (20) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF DELIVERY 
OF THIS SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT AS EVIDENCED BY THE RETURN RECEIPT, OR 
A JUDGEMENT BY DEFAULT MAY BE ENTERED AGAINST YOU FOR THE MONEY OR 
THE OTHERS THINGS DEMANDED IN THE COMPLAINT. You must also file the 
original of your Answer with the Clerk of this Court within a reason-
able time afterwaeds. 
You need not answer if the Plaintiff has not filed the Complaint 
within (10) days after service. You may contact the Court Clerk at 
least (13) days after service to determine if the Complaint has been 
filed. The address and phone number is: 4th District Court Utah County/ 
125 North 100 West/ Provo Utah 84601. (801) 429-1112. 
Play 12* 2003 QUAJU, /Liny 
T Buddy Ptfbitt 222271 
Limestone Corr. Facility 15-66B 
28779 Nick Davis RD. 
Harvest AL 35749 
UiMO 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
*p- ^7-^3? ,^K5eputy 




THE ADOPTION C o l t e r of CHOICE/ 
JOHN and JANE DOE, 
(Whose names are unknown), 
DEFENDANTS. 
COMPLAINT 
Comes now Buddy Pruitt/ Plaintiff, in the above styled cause, Pro 
Se, and complains of the Defendants, The Adopt ion f"£Hl/7< J^ Choice (here-
inafter the Agency), and John and Jane Doe, who are the prospective 
adoptive parents of the newborn child of which the Plaintiff is the 
biological father of, that said child is being placed for adoption with-
out the consent of the Plaintiff/ by termination of his parental rights 
pursuant to 78-30-4.14 (Utah Code), and that the same statute as applied 
to Plaintiff/ deprived him of due proccess; Plaintiff also claims that 
he is entitled to dismissal of the adoption petition of his child 
pursuant to 78-30-4.15 (Utah Code). 
In support of said cause of action, the Plaintiff states to this 
Honorable Court the following: 
1. Plaintiff and Lisa Sadler arc the biological parents of a new-
uurn son, Dorn out of wedlock on or about November 22, 2002, in which 
." o
v\\\ and Jane Doe are at tern piling to adopc-
' '\ o n r t ^  *\ 
2, Plaintiff and Sadler are both long time residents of Bi rrninglra^ ; !' 
CASE NO. o^a 40 *?(**( 
3. The Plaintiff was sentenced to an Alabama state prison on 
March 22/ 2002/ for a non-violent first offense case of theft of pro-
perty/ on a twenty two month sentence/ with a release date of January 3/ 
2004/ but he also has a strong possibility of parole on April 30/ 2003. 
4. The Plaintiff and Sadler first learned of her pregnancy on 
March 26/ 2002. 
5. From the very first moment that the Plaintiff learned of Sadler's 
pregnancy/ he made known to his family/ Sadler/ and Sadler's 19 year 
old daughter/ Leigh Ann Urley/ of his intentions and desires of raising 
and providing for his child/ and being a major part of his child's 
life. 
6. Plaintiff invited Sadler to stay with his mother, for emotion-
al and financial support/ until the Plaintiff's release. The Plaintiff 
assured Sadler that his family would provide for her,and their child, 
until his release. 
7. In that time, neither did Sadler inform the Plaintiff or his 
family of her intentions of placing their child for adoption, nor 
leaving the state of Alabama and going to Utah. 
8. Plaintiff and his family have,through every reasonable means, 
attempted to locate Sadler, but have had no success in doing so. 
9. On October 18, 2002, Plaintiff received a letter from The 
Adoption Agency of Choice, asking him to relinquish his parental rights 
and give his consent for the adoption of his child. ( EXHIBIT #1) 
10. On or about October 25, 2002, the Plaintiff called the Agency 
and told a social worker there, Annette Monson, that he denied his 
consent for the adoption of his son, and informed the Agency that 
he wanted custody of his child. 
11. On October 31, 2002, the Plaintiff mailed to the Agency and 
the 4th District Court of Utah County/ a signed and notarized letter 
of Answer and Denial of Consent/ in which the Plaintiff denied his 
consent for the adoption of his child/ and also asserted his parental 
rights. On or about November 97 2002, the 4th District Court returned 
the Plaintiff's letter of Denial of Consent/ attached with a note 
that stated that there was no case listed under the Plaintiff's or 
Sadler's name. ( EXHIBIT #2) 
12. On November 7, 2002, the Plaintiff sent a letter to the 4th 
District Court of Utah County requesting appointed counsel/ but only 
received a letter from the Court Clerk, stating that the Court could 
not provide any legal assistance. ( EXHIBIT #3 ) 
13. On or about November 5/ 2002, Plaintiff sent a request to 
the Madison County Department of Human Resources, asking their office 
to assist the Plaintiff in obtaining custody of his child. 
14. On or about November 13, 2002, the Plaintiff received a 
letter from the Madison County DHR, acknowledging receipt of his 
letter, and then the Plaintiff was directed to their Montgomery AL. 
office, where the Putative Father Registry is located. ( EXHIBIT #4) 
15. On December 14, 2002, the Plaintiff completed/ signed/ 
notarized, and fowarded the necessary papers to the State of Alabama 
Department of Human Resources Putative Father Registry in Montgomery 
AL./ to register with their office/ as required by 26-10C-1 (Alabama 
Code)/ for a father of a child born out of wedlock to claim paternity 
of that child/ and to be entitled to power of consent over his child's 
adoption. ( EXHIBIT #5 ) 
16. On or aoout Febuary- 9, 2003/ the Plaintiff received a notice 
from the State of Alabama DHR, stating that they had received the J j 
necessary information for the Plaintiff to be listed on the Putative 
Father Registry. ( EXHIBIT #6 ) 
17. On December 23, 2002, the Plaintiff sent a letter to the 
Agency informing them that the Plaintiff filed an acknowledgement 
of paternity with the Alabama Putative Father Registry, and also 
demanded custody of his child. ( EXHIBIT #7 ) 
18, The Plaintiff was unaware of his duty to file his acknowledge-
ment of paternity, in Utah, before his child was surrendered by Sadler 
to the Agency, due to no fault of his own,because of no access to 
Utah statutes in the law library in the correctional facility where 
he is housed, despite the Plaintiff's diligent efforts to protect 
his parental rights, by studying and researching the law books there. 
19. The Plaintiff has written over (50) letters to various attorneys, 
legal agencies, state bar associations, and governmental offices 
seeking legal guidence, and or, pro bono representation, to protect 
his parental rights and obtain custody of his child.( See EXHIBIT #8 
for list of inquiries ) 
20. The Plaintiff's requests for legal assistance yielded only 
answers, denying assistance for the Plaintiff. ( EXHIBITS #9 through 
#18 ) 
21. The Plaintiff also spoke to administration of the correctional 
facility, seeking legal guidence or representation in this matter, 
as instructed by an Alabama Congressman ( EXHIBIT 19 ), but was ^enied 
any legal assistance. 
22. The Plaintiff is uneducated and unexperienced in civil law, 
and despite numerous attempts to obtain legal guidence or representation 
the Plaintiff has been unsuccessful in doing so. 
23. The Plaintiff finally learned of Utah's laws concerning putaJ yj^n.lj 
tive fathers on Febuary 8, 2003, when a reporter. Holly Hollman, from 
The Decatur Daily newspaper in Decatur Al, sent the Plaintiff a letter 
informing him of Utah's statutes ( EXHIBIT #20 ), and despite the 
Plaintiff's lack of education and experience in law, he has diligently 
and quickly worked to prepare the papers necessary, to initiate a 
lawsuit to gain custody of his child. 
24. Plaintiff has met all of the requirements of 78-30-4.15 ( Utah 
Code ), to entitle him the right to contest the adoption of his child. 
25. The operation of 78-30-4.14 (Utah Code), as applied to the 
Plaintiff, deprived him of due proccess, due to the fact that the 
Plaintiff was not able to comply with that same statute, through no 
fault of his own. 
26. The Plaintiff's biological brother and sister-in-law, George 
and Angie Pruitt, in Birmingham AL, want to be awarded primary care 
and physical custody of the Plaintiff's child, until final decision 
of this Honorable Court. ( EXHIBITS #21 and #22 ) 
27. The Plaintiff comes now before the Court and asks for inter-
vention in this same matter. 
28. The Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm unless this Honorable 
Court makes immediate intervention, because the Plaintiff will forever 
lose his parental rights and will not be able to contest this attempted 
adoption, once the final adoption decree is entered, pursuant to 
78-30-4.16 (Utah Code), and precious time is running out for the 
Plaintiff. 
29. The threatened injury to the Plaintiff of forever losing his 
parental rights enormously outweighs whatever, if any, damage the 
proposed order and injunction may cause tne Defendants. 
30. The order and injunction/ if issued/ would not be adverse to 
public interest/ because a parent's constitutionally protected "liberty" 
includes the right to bring up children/ under the 14th Ammendment 
of the United States Constitution. 
31. There is a sudstantial likelihood that the Plaintiff will 
prevail on the merits of his underlying claim, that he should be en-
titled to a dismissal of his child's attempted adoption by the Defendants 
and that he shoulc^also be entitled to an evidentiary hearing to 
decide the custody of his son. 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays: 
l.That a Temporary Restraining Order be issued restraining the 
Defendants from proceeding with the adoption of the Plaintiff's 
child. 
2.That an order be issued directing the Defendants to appear, 
on a certain day to be fixed by the Court, and then there show cause/ 
if any they have, why a Preliminary Injunction should not be issued 
to: 
A) Enjoin the Defendants from exercising custody of the Plaintiff's 
child, 
B) Have this Honorable Court dismiss the adoption petition and 
conduct an evidentiary hearing to decide who should have custody of 
the Plaintiff's child, 
C) To award the Plaintiff's biological brother and sister-in-
' i P f* P r* *" 
law a pendete lite order giving them primary care and physical cusTcydy^^' 
of the Plaintiff's child/ until final decision of this Court. 
BUDDY PRUITT 222271 
LIMESTONE CORR. FACILITY 
28779 NICK DAVIS RD. 
HARVEST AL 35749 
STATE OF ALABAMA ) 
COUNTY OF LIMESTONE ) 
Before me, the undersigned authority/ in and for said County 
and State/ personally appeared BUDDY PRUITT, who after being sworn 
on oath doth depose and say that the statements in the foregoing 
Complaint are true and correct to the best of his information, 
knowledge, and belief-
JS 
BUDDY PRFITT 222271 
LIMESTONE CORR. FACILITY 15-66B 
28779 NICK DAVIS RD. 
HARVEST AL 35749 
Sworn to and subscribed before me on this 
2003. 
^-IX-tAg 
MY COMMISION EXPIRES 
4TH DISTRICT COURT, PROVO DEPT COURT 




ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No: 030402464 
Judge: GARY D. STOTT 
Date: 6/6/2003 
Clerk: keris 
The Court has received the Plaintiff's motion for temporary 
restraining order and accompanying documents. Afer reviewing the 
file and the motion, the Court respectfully denies the request. The 
Defendant must be served and have an opportunity to appear and 
address the relief requested• 
Judge GARYyS. {STOTT )C1}t^*xsj£? 
"<r. 
/ 
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WOOD CRAPO ar 
Larry S.Jenkins (#4854) 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)366-6060 
Attorneys for Defendant The Adoption Center of Choice 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BUDDY PRUITT, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
v. ] 
THE ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE, ] 
JOHN AND JANE DOE (whose names are ; 
unknown), ) 
Defendants. ) 
> MOTION TO DISMISS CIVIL 
) COMPLAINT FOR CUSTOD Y OF 
) AN INFANT CHILD FOR 
) FAILURE TO STA TE A CLAIM 
i Case No. 030402464 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant 
Adoption Center of Choice respectfully moves the Court for an order dismissing plaintiffs Civil 
Complaint for Custody of An Infant (the "Complaint") for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. The Complaint and the documents incorporated into the Complaint, as 
well as public documents obtained from the State Registrar of Vital Statistics, show clearly that 
plaintiff has not complied with Utah law to establish any rights to the minor child that is the 
subject of these proceedings and which has been placed for adoption. As such, he has no claim 
for custody of the child and his Complaint should be dismissed. 
PROW 
This motion is supported by a memorandum of law filed contemporaneously. 
DATED this 5 day of June, 2003. 
WOOD CRAPO, LLC 
Larry, 
AttorneysTor Defendant The Adoption Center 
of Choice 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify this J> day of June, 2003, that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS CIVIL COMPLAINT FOR CUSTODY OF AN 
INFANT CHILD FOR FAILURE TO STA TEA CLAIM to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Buddy PruittAIS# 222271 
Limestone Corr. Facility 
28779 Nick Davis Rd. 
Harvest, AL 35749 
S \VPDATA\PLEADrNG\ADOPTION 0 E N T ER OF CHOICE PRUlll MO HON TO DISMISS COMPLAINT wpd 
00006,') 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Larry S.Jenkins (#4854) 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)366-6060 
Attorneys for Defendant The Adoption Center of Choice 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BUDDY PRUITT, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
v. ] 
THE ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE, ] 
JOHN AND JANE DOE (whose names are ; 
unknown), ] 
Defendants. ) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION TO DISMISS CIVIL 
) COMPLAINT FOR CUSTODY OF 
) AN INFANT CHILD FOR 
) FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 
) Case No. 030402464 
I Judge Gary D. Stott 
Utah law is clear. An unwed birth father loses all parental rights regarding a child 
placed for adoption if he has not strictly and fully complied with the requirements of Utah law set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-30-4.14 and 78-30-4.15(4) before the birth mother relinquishes 
the child for adoption. According to the facts as stated by plaintiff, and according to the State 
Registrar of Vital Statistics, the putative birth father in this case, Buddy Pruitt, did nothing under 
Utah law at the proper time to establish his parental rights to the child at issue and, therefore, his 





Mr. Pruitt claims to be the father of a child bom to Lisa Sadler on or about 
November 22, 2002. Complaint |^ 1. Mr. Pruitt first learned of the pregnancy on or about 
March 26, 2002. Complaint H 4. Just prior to that, on March 22, 2002, Mr. Pruitt was sentenced 
to the Alabama State Prison on a 22-month sentence for a felony conviction. Complaint *\\ 3. 
On October 18, 2002, Mr. Pruitt received notification from the Adoption Center 
of Choice (the "Adoption Center") that Ms. Sadler intended to place the child for adoption in 
Utah and requesting that he give consent to the adoption. Complaint ^ 9. Mr. Pruitt called the 
Adoption Center on or about October 25, 2002, and told a social worker, Annette Monson, he 
would not consent to the adoption. Complaint }\ 10. 
Ms. Monson prepared an affidavit concerning the substance of her conversation 
with Mr. Pruitt, which she noted occurred on October 23, 2002. A copy of this affidavit is 
attached as Exhibit A. Ms. Monson told Mr. Pruitt, among other things, that 
Lisa was now residing in Utah and that the adoption would be 
proceeding according to Utah law. I told him that, if he had 
concerns about the adoption, he needed to consult with an attorney 
in Utah regarding his rights. I explained that I could not advise 
him of his legal rights in Utah as I was not an attorney and that he 
would need to address his rights through Utah law if he had any 
objections. 
Exhibit A. 
Mr. Pruitt then wrote to a law firm in Provo, Utah, seeking representation. He 
received a letter dated November 4, 2002, from Mark F. Robinson of Robinson, Seiler & Glazier, 
P.C., informing him that "[t]o preserve whatever rights you may have, you will need to proceed 
2 
fj on 
immediately to file a paternity action and assert the parental rights with the Department of 
Health." Complaint Ex. 10. 
The child was actually bom November 12, 2002, and Ms. Sadler relinquished the 
child to the Adoption Center on November 14, 2002, for placement for adoption. See Exhibit B, 
which is a copy of Ms. Sadler's Relinquishment and Statement of Understanding. Ms. Sadler 
stated in her Relinquishment that she was not married to the father of the child. Exhibit B. The 
Adoption Center obtained a Certificate of Search For Notice of the Initiation of Proceedings to 
Establish Paternity dated November 15, 2002, indicating that as of that date no one had filed a 
notice of the initiation of paternity proceedings with the State Registrar of Vital Statistics. A 
copy of this certificate is attached as Exhibit C. 
Mr. Pruitt filed the Complaint on May 27, 2003, more than seven months after the 
child had been born and placed for adoption. Importantly, the Complaint does not state that Mr. 
Pruitt is flilly able and willing to have full custody of the child, nor does he agree to a court order 
of child support or of the payment of expenses incurred by Ms. Sadler during her pregnancy and 
birth of the child. See Complaint. The only thing Mr. Pruitt says is that he wants the Court to 
award custody of the child to his brother and sister-in-law. Complaint ^ 26. The Complaint also 
is not a complaint for paternity under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-l et seq. 
Subsequent to the filing of the Complaint in this action, Adoption Center obtained 
a second Certificate of Search For Notice of the Initiation of Proceedings to Establish Paternity, 
indicating that as of June 4, 2003, neither Mr. Pruitt nor anyone else had filed a notice of the 
initiation of paternity proceedings with the State Registrar of Vital Statistics. A copy of this 
certificate is attached as Exhibit D. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LAW LIMITS THE RIGHTS OF UNWED FATHERS. 
It is well-established law that the state's strong interest in immediate and secure 
adoptions for eligible newborns provides a sufficient justification for significant variations in the 
parental rights of unwed putative fathers, who, in contrast to birth mothers, are not automatically 
identified by virtue of their role in the process of birth. See Wells v. Children 's Aid Society of 
Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 203 (Utah 1984). See also Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(3)(b) ("If an 
unmarried biological father fails to grasp the opportunities to establish a relationship with his 
child that are available to him, his biological parental interest may be lost entirely, or greatly 
diminished in constitutional significance by his failure to timely exercise it, or by his failure to 
strictly comply with the available legal steps to substantiate it."); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4.12(3)(d) ("An unmarried biological father has the primary responsibility to protect his 
rights."). 
In Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 77 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1983), the 
court stated that the rights of a parent are measured by the responsibilities they have assumed. 
Thus, 
[wjhen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood by "com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child," his 
interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the 
due process clause . . . . But the mere existence of a biological link does not 
merit equivalent constitutional protection, 
463 U.S. at 261, 103 S. Ct. at 2993 (emphasis added; citation omitted). 
4 
II. IN UTAH, AN UNWED FATHER MUST TAKE CERTAIN STEPS 
BEFORE THE MOTHER RELINQUISHES FOR ADOPTION TO 
ESTABLISH ANY RIGHTS TO THE CHILD. 
Consistent with United States Supreme Court and Utah Supreme Court precedent, 
Utah's Legislature has struck the necessary balance between the competing interests of a 
newborn child in being placed by its mother in a permanent adoptive home and the unwed man 
wrho claims to be the child's father. This balance has been struck in Utah Code Ann. 
§78-30-4.14. 
Under section 78-30-4.14, to protect his rights, the unmarried biological father 
must (1) "initiate proceedings to establish paternity under Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on 
Paternity"; (2) 'Tile with th[e] court a sworn affidavit stating that he is fully able and willing to 
have full custody of the child, setting forth his plans for care of the child, and agreeing to a court 
order of child support and the payment of expenses incurred in connection with the mother's 
pregnancy and the child's birth"; (3) "file notice of the commencement of paternity proceedings 
with the state registrar of vital statistics within the Department of Health"; and (4) "if he had 
actual knowledge of the pregnancy, pa[y] a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred 
in connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth." See Utah Code Ann. 
§78~30-4.14(2)(b).1 
Importantly, all of these conditions must be performed by the unmarried birth 
father "prior to the time the mother executes her consent for adoption or relinquishes the child to 
a licensed child-placing agency." Id. § 78-30-4.14(b) (emphasis added). If he does not "fully 
1
 These six conditions apply to an unmarried biological father's rights to a child who has 
been placed for adoption within six months of the child's birth. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-
4.14(2)(b). The child in this case was placed for adoption within two days of his birth. 
5 
and strictly comply" with these conditions prior to relinquishment, an unmarried biological 
father is "deemed" by the law to have "waived and surrendered any right in relation to [his] 
child . . . including the right to notice of any judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption 
of the child" and "his consent to the adoption of the child is not required." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4.14(5) (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals have 
both made it clear that strict compliance, not substantial compliance, is required to establish 
rights under this section. In re Adoption ofB.B.D., 984 P.2d 967, 970-71 (Utah 1999) (strict 
compliance required); In re Adoption ofW, 904 P.2d 1113, 1121 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that requiring strict compliance with the adoption statutes is 
reasonable because of the nature of adoptions."). 
III. THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS APPLY TO MR. PRUITT EVEN 
THOUGH HE IS A RESIDENT OF ALABAMA. 
The legal effect of a non-resident, unwed birth father's failure to comply with the 
Utah adoption code, and how that failure impacts the question of whether his rights should be 
terminated, was recently examined by the Utah Supreme Court in In re Adoption ofB.B.D., 984 
P.2d 967 (Utah 1999). The birth father in In re B.B.D. was a resident of Washington who had 
impregnated his girlfriend after they began dating. Shortly after finding out about her pregnancy, 
the birth mother discussed with the birth father the options regarding their unborn child's future, 
which included placing the child for adoption in Utah. The birth father was opposed to this 
option at the outset of their discussions. Id. at 969. Yet, he did nothing in Utah to establish 
rights to the child. 
6 
Before the Supreme Court, the birth father argued that his parental rights were 
protected by the constitution and could not be terminated without a showing of unfitness. The 
court found this argument to be without merit. Relying on Wells and Lehr, it stated that "[w]hile 
it is true that the relationship between parent and child is afforded some protection by the federal 
and state constitutions,... the rights of parents are commensurate with the responsibilities they 
have assumed, and in the case of unmarried fathers, a biological relationship alone is 
insufficient to establish constitutionally protected parental rights." In re B.B.D., 984 P.2d at 
970. The court continued: 
Under Utah law, "an unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that 
acquires constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a timely and full 
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy and 
upon the child's birth." An unmarried father demonstrates his commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood "by providing appropriate medical care and 
financial support, and by establishing legal paternity, in accordance with the 
requirements of [Utah law]'9 If an unmarried father fails to adhere to these 
requirements, including taking the necessary steps to establish paternity, "his 
biological parental interest may be lost entirely, or greatly diminished in 
constitutional significance by his failure to timely exercise it, or by his failure to 
strictly comply with the available legal steps to substantiate it." 
Id. at 970 (bold emphasis added; citations omitted; italics and brackets in original). 
The Supreme Court carefully distinguished between the rights of the birth mother 
and the rights of the unmarried birth father with regard to terminating the birth father's rights and 
the placing of a child for adoption. The Court stated: 
The unmarried mother, because she is "faced with the responsibility of making 
crucial decisions about the future of a newborn child, is entitled to privacy, and 
has the right to make timely and appropriate decisions regarding her future and the 
future of the child, and is entitled to assurance regarding the permanence of an 
adoptive placement." [Utah Code Ann.] § 78-30-4.12(2)(b). An unmarried father, 
on the other hand, "by virtue of the fact that he has engaged in a sexual 
relationship with a woman, is deemed to be on notice that a pregnancy and an 
7 
adoption proceeding regarding that child may occur." [Utah Code Ann.] 
§ 78-30-4.13(1). Because he is deemed to be on notice, it becomes his 
responsibility to protect his own rights . . . according to the requirements of 
section 78-30-4.13 to 4.15 . . . . If an unmarried father fails to "fully and 
strictly comply" with the [requirements of section 78-30-4.13 to -4.15], he "is 
deemed to have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the child." 
Id. at 971 (emphasis added). 
hi applying these principles to the facts in B.B.D., the Supreme Court found that 
the birth father had done none of the things required under Utah law to establish his parental 
rights to his child. The father knew his girlfriend was pregnant, knew that she had gone to Utah 
to have the baby, and knew that she was going to place the baby for adoption. Id. at 971. 
Despite this, the birth father "failed to take any action to establish paternity according to [Utah's] 
statutory scheme." Id. As a result, the birth father waived and surrendered any right he had to 
his child. Id. 
In this case, Mr. Pruitt also failed to strictly comply with Utah law to establish his 
parental rights. He knew the birth mother was residing in Utah nearly a month before the child 
was born, and he obtained legal advice about what he needed to do to establish his rights to the 
child. Complaint f^ f 9-10 and Ex. 10. Yet, he waited until the child was more than seven 
months old to file an action in court, and he has never filed a notice with the State Registrar of 
Vital Statistics. Exhibits C and D. There is also no evidence that he has paid anything to the 
birth mother for her expenses of the pregnancy and birth. 
His Complaint is clearly tardy and not entitled to any effect, but even the content 
of the Complaint does not meet the requirements of the statute. He did not "file with th[e] court 
a sworn affidavit stating that he is fully able and willing to have full custody of the child, setting 
8 
forth his plans for care of the child, and agreeing to a court order of child support and the 
payment of expenses incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth." 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(i). 
Having failed to meet the requirements of section 78-30-4.14(2)(b), Mr. Pruitt is 
deemed to have waived and surrendered his right to notice of this proceeding or of any adoption 
proceeding, and his consent to the adoption is not required. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(5). 
Mr. Pruitt is also unable to take advantage of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4.15(4), which deal with non-resident birth fathers, because he admits he knew the birth 
mother was living here and planned to place the child for adoption. Thus, because he knew the 
birth mother was residing in Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4) required that he comply with 
Utah law in protecting his rights. See In re Adoption ofB.B.D., 984 P.2d 967, 974 (Utah 1999). 
He has failed to do so, and his rights to notice were waived and surrendered, and his consent was 
not required for the adoption.2 
IV. THE FACT OF MR. PRUITT'S INCARCERATION DOES NOT CHANGE 
ANYTHING. 
Mr. Pruitt could argue that he was precluded from doing what he needed to do 
under Utah law because he is incarcerated. While no Utah courts have addressed the issue, the 
New York courts have under a statute similar to Utah's. Those courts have held that 
incarceration does not relieve a natural father of the obligations he has under the law to establish 
his rights. See In re Adoption of Anonymous, In re Adoption of Anonymous, 191 Misc. 2d 366, 
369, 744 N.Y.S.2d 798, 800 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2002) ("incarceration does excuse the father from his 
2
 Indeed, the Adoption Center notes that the adoption was finalized on May 20, 2003, 
one week before Mr. Pruitt filed this action. 
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obligation to pay support"); In re Amanda, 197 A,D.2d 923, 924, 602 N.Y.S.2d 461 (N.Y. App. 
Dept. 1993) ("[t]he fact that a parent is incarcerated does not in itself excuse his failure to 
support, maintain contact with, or plan for the future of the child"). Thus, even though he was 
incarcerated, Mr. Pruitt had the same obligations of strict compliance with the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b) if he wanted any rights. Indeed, his incarceration may actually 
show that he abandoned any rights to the child. 
Mr. Pruitt committed the offense of theft of property when he knew he had been 
having sexual relations with Ms. Sadler and that she could potentially be pregnant. In W. T.J. v. 
E. W.R., 111 So.2d 723 (Fla. 1998), the Florida Supreme Court was asked to consider whether a 
married natural father had abandoned his child where, after learning his wife was pregnant, he 
committed serious crimes that carried potentially long prison terms. In that case, the father, after 
learning his wife was pregnant, committed the crimes of kidnaping, sexual battery, and 
aggravated assault, and he was sentenced to 20 years in prison. 721 So.2d at 724. The Florida 
Supreme Court noted the general rule that incarceration by itself does not constitute 
abandonment, but held that in that case, because he knew the mother was pregnant and that he 
could go to prison for a long time, the facts supported a finding of abandonment. It wrote: 
Incarceration is a fact which the trial court may consider together 
with other facts to determine whether clear and convincing 
evidence of abandonment exists. The facts here reveal that this 
father kidnapped and sexually battered another woman when the 
mother of his child was pregnant. The foreseeable consequences 
of these violent criminal offenses was the lengthy term of 
incarceration he received. As a result of his actions, the 
natural father will be confined for a substantial period of the 
child's minority. These facts are relevant and sufficiently 
egregious that they may be considered conduct which supports a 
finding of abandonment.... 
Id. at 725 (emphasis added). 
10 
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In this case, Mr. Pruitt had been having sexual relations with Ms. Sadler and is 
charged with knowledge that she could be pregnant. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.13(1) ("An 
unmarried biological father, by virtue of the fact that he has engaged in a sexual relationship with 
a woman, is deemed to be on notice that a pregnancy and an adoption proceeding regarding that 
child may occur"). Nonetheless, he committed an offense that got him imprisoned for 22 
months. Complaint f 3. These facts are "sufficiently egregious" for the Court the determine that 
Mr. Pruitt abandoned the child, and that he did not have any intent of establishing his rights to 
the child or of taking any responsibility for it or for its future. His primary focus appears to have 
been on his criminal activity, rather than being a father. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Adoption Center requests that the Court dismiss the 
Complaint for failure to state a claim. 
DATED this j C day of June, 2003. 
WOOD CRAPO, LLC 
Attorneys TofDefendant The Adoption Center 
of Choice 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify this 'y day of June, 2003, that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CIVIL 
COMPLAINT FOR CUSTOD Y OF AN INFANT CHILD FOR FAIL URE TO STA TE A 
CLAIM to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Buddy PruittAIS# 222271 
Limestone Corr Facility 
28779 Nick Davis Rd. 
Harvest, AL 35749 
-a 








BIRTH FATHER INTERACTION AFFIDAVIT 
On October 23, 2002 I, Annette Mouson, received a phone call from Buddy Pruitt He staled that he was calling 
with the assistance of his chaplain at prison He said that he was the birth father of Lisa Sadler's baby and bad 
received relinquishment papers from our agency regarding the placement of said child for adoption. He said that 
he had lost contact with Lisa about 4 months ago and would like to talk with her. 1 checked with Lisa Sadler, who 
was at that moment receiving counseling from Gaye Davis, MSW; Social Service Director. I was informed that 
she did not wish to speak with him. I told Buddy that Lisa did not wish to talk with him. He staled that he did not 
want to sign any relinquishment papers. He said he did not want the child placed for adoption and wanted to keep 
him. He said that he had family that could help care for the baby while he was incarcerated I explained to him 
that Lisa had reviewed all her options for the child before choosing adoption and had already determined that his 
raising the child was not what she wanted for her child. Buddy stated that he was the ^ lood father" of the baby 
and that we shouldn't be able to do anything without his consent. J explained to him that Lisa was now residing 
in Utah and that the adoption would be proceeding according to Utah law. I told him that, if he had concerns 
about the adoption, he needed to consult with an attorney in Utah regarding his rights. T explained that I could not 
advise him of his Jegal rights in Utah as I was not an attorney and that he would need to address his rights through 
Utah law if he had any objections. I asked him if ho wished to call again if Lisa were willing to do a conference 
call with him. He said that he just wanted to have Lisa write him a letter. I told him that I would relay this 
message to Lisa but that 1 could not guarantee she would choose to do this. I again advised him to contact an 
attorney in Utah if he had concerns about his parental rights and ended the conversation. 
Annette Monson, SSW Date 
Notary 
State of "jjJaM^ 
County of ^ J ^ J O ~ p ^ 
On this £S& day of (T^JcrUuX^ , 20 ©^L, before mc _, a Notary Puonc, 
personally appeared J\^vu~s^jn£JP~*"TUiTX-5<A^ , personally known to mc (or proved to me on the basis of 
satisfactory evidence) to be the same person who signed the foregoing document ia ray presence and who swore or affirmed 
to mc that their signature was voluntary and the document truthful. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed by official seal the day and year in which this certificate 
was first above written 
Notary 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF UTAH 
My Commission Fxpires 
November 11JP004 
SANDRA W.bAVlS 
241 West 520 NOiLH 
Orem. Utah 84057 
es B 
iMtsuJttp CTbAt*y^ 
My Commission Expires It-//-Zoo Y 




o o o ^ 1 
The 
Adoption" 
C e n t e r s / C h o i c e 
RELINQUISHMENT 
I, Lisa Sadler, being first duly sworn on oa\h depose and say: 
I am the parent of a baby boy, namely, Joshua Tyler Sadler born on the 12th day of November, 2002, at 8:38 
PM, at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center in the city of Provo, State of Utah* 
I am not an enrolled memher of a Native American tribe or of an Alaskan Village tribe and, to the best of 
ray knowledge; I am not eligible for membership in a Native American tribe or an Alaskan Village tribe. 
1 am not and was not married at the time of conception to the birth father, 
I am aware that, by signing this document, my consent is final and irrevocable. 
I understand that if I choose adoption for my child and sign the relinquishing papers, all my rights and 
responsibilities for this child will be ended, and that my consent is final and legally binding. 
I do hereby relinquish and surrender said child for adoption to: 
The Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. 
241 West 520 North Oram, UT 84057 
an organization licensed by the Department of Social Services, State of Utah, to find homes for children 
and to place children in homes for adoption. It is fiilly understood by mc that when this relinquishment is 
signed, all my rights to the custody, services and earnings for said minor child and any responsibility for 







State of (jT\ 
On this _ /l/ra/day of AoOeHf^^. 
appeared before me 
County of UT. 
_, 2002? / x ^ S/)0L£7Z_. 
*74m£r$ tf..^$4££i 
. _j personally 
_, a sworn Notary Public in and 
for said county and state, who is personally known to mc (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to 
he the same person whose name is subscribed to this instrument and signed the foregoing document in my 
presence and who swore or affirmed to mc that their signature was voluntary and the document truthfoL 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, T have hereunto set my hand and affixed by off> 
certificate was first above written. 
JAMES H. BOLES 
J 1034 NORTH SOC WEST 
W PROVO. UT 84602 
COMM. EXP. 8-15-2005 
seal the day and year in which this 
'MS01 224-2440 
Ru 801 224-18^9 
The 
Adoption* 
Centers f Choice 
Statement of Understanding 
Please Initial
 x j^y u n d e r s t a i l d t^t: 
1. As the birth parent, I have the primary right to parent this child, even if I am a minor. 
2, There may be services and sources of financial assistance in the community which could 
be made available to me should I choose to parent this child. 
i 0 \ 3. 1 have the right to know that the agency has the sole discretion to determine the 
/ placement of this child but nothing in this statement shall deny a birth parentis) request 
for an identified placement. 
UK 
4. Legislation has made it possible for children relinquished for adoption to obtain 
knowledge regarding their birth parents. 
5. I am aware of the Utah Voluntary Consent Registry coordinated through the Utah 
Department of Vital Statistics that allows me to register my wish to be placed in contact 
with my child once he/she is of age if he/she also chooses to register. 
6. T hereby waive notice of any and all legal proceedings which may be held in courts of the 
State of Utah, or elsewhere, in connection with the adoption of this child 
7. My decision to relinquish this child for adoption has been made voluntarily and of my 
own free will, without any coercion, force or duress from anyone including 
representatives of The Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. I have received or been offered 
a copy of this document, 
8. I am not under the influence of any drugs, alcohol or medication that might affect my 
reasoning or judgment 
9. 1 understand that if T choose adoption for my child and sign the relinquishing papers, all 
my rights and responsibilities for this child will be ended, and that my consent is final, 
irrevocable and legally binding. 
I have read and understood this statement of understanding. 
Lisa Sadler Date 
\ ^ / '*>.! $01 224-2440 




UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
CERTIFICATE OF SEARCH 
FOR NOTICE OF THE INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS TO ESTABLISH PATERNITY 
Name of Mother 
I L i s a S a d l e r 
(Place of Child's Birth 
-Provo^ Utrah -
Date of Child's Birth or Estimated Birth Date 
—November- 12, 2002 — 
|Sex of Child 
-Male— 
This is to certify that a search has been made of the file of Notices of the Initiation of Proceedings to Establish Paternity 
and/or the father's name is reported on the birth certificate with the Office of Vital Records and Statistrcs, and no record 
was found to be on file. 
If a Notice of the Initiation of Proceedings to Establish Paternity is found on file or the father's name is reported on the 
birth certificate, a certified copy will be issued If no record is on file, a CERTIFICATE OF SEARCH is issued. 
I 
November 15, 2002 9:34 AM p o ^ ^ 
Date ' Time , Stete Registrar 
UDH-OVRS-23 Revised 01/01 
0 
•*1 O 
uiMn ucrMi\i men i ur n w in 
CERTIFICATE OF SEARCH 
FOR NOTICE OF THE INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS TO ESTABLISH PATERNITY 
Name of Mother 
Lisa Sadler 
Place of Child's Birth 
Unknown 
Date of Child's Birth or Estimated Birth Date 
November 12, 2002 
Sex of Child 
male 
This is to certify that a search has been made of the file of Notices of the Initiation of Proceedings to Establish Paternity 
and/or the father's name is reported on the birth certificate with the Office of Vital Records and Statistics, and no record 
was found to be on file. 
If a Notice of the Initiation of Proceedings to Establish Paternity is found on file or the father's name is reported on the 
birth certificate, a certified copy will be issued. If no record is on file, a CERTIFICATE OF SEARCH is issued. 
June*4 3^9 003 I ? ; 1 6 PM 
Date Time t&SSfcSSZgl *
U
^M istra 
UDH-OVRS-23 Revised 01/01 
000071 
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THE ADOPTION CENTER 
of CHOICE et al/ 
DEFENDANTS. 
CASE NO. 030402464 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME TO RESPOND 
Comes now the Plaintiff/ Buddy Pruitt/ pro se, in the above 
entitled cause/ and moves this Honorable Court to grant this Motion/ 
pursuant to Rule 6(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ to enlarg 
the time for the Plaintiff to respond to the Defedant's Motion To 
Dismiss/ Summary Judgement. 
This Motion is supported by a memorandum of law filed contemp-
oraneously. 
DATED this % day of ^Jo^nC / 2 0 0 3 . 
A \ ^ ^ A &LL ZttL 
Buddy Pruitt 222271 
L.C.F. 15-66B 
28779 Nick Davis RD. 
Harvest AL 35749 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Motion For Enlargement of Time To Respond upon: 
(Attorney for Adoption Center of Choice) 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Larry S. Jenkins (#4854) 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City/ Utah 84111 
by placing the same in the United States Mail/ postage prepaid/ and 
properly addressed on thisg£ day of Jhn^l /2003. 
4th District Court 
125 North 100 West 
Provo Utah 84601 
njuZtX 
Buddy Pruitt 222271 
L.C.F. 15-66B 
28779 Nick Davis RD 
Harvest AL 35749 
0')rHl4 
L&plity 




ADOPTION CENTER OF 
CHOICE et al# 
DEFENDANTS. 
CASE NO. 030402464 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
MOTION FOR ORDER UNDER RULE 56 
Of UTAH RULES of CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Comes now the Plaintiff/ Buddy Pruitt/ pro se; in the above 
entitled cause/ and moves this Honorable Court to grant this Motion 
For Order Under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ by 
denying the Defendant's Motion To Dismiss/ Summary Judgement/ or 
order a continuance to permit affadavits to be obtained/ and discovery 
to be had in order to take deposition. 
This Motion is supported by a memorandum of law filed contemp-
oraneously. 
DATED this 3^ day of Ai\f\£ /2003. 
^ P ' 
Buddy Pruitt 222271 
L.C.F. 15-66B 
28779 Nick Davis RD. 
Harvest AL 35749 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Motion For Order Under Rule 56 of Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure upon: 
(Attorney for Adoption Center of Choice) 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Larry S. Jenkins (#4854) 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City/ Utah 84111 
by placing the same in the United States Mail/ postage prepaid/ and 
properly addressed on this^6 day of c\\C\& /2003. 
4th District Court 
125 North 100 West 
Provo Utah 84601 
Buddy Pruitt 222271 
L.C.F. 15-66B 
28779 Nick Davis RD. 
Harvest AL 35749 
o o n o 9 n 
AFFADAVIT OF BUDDY PRUITT 
STATE OF ALABAMA ) 
COUNTY OF LIMESTONE ) 
Before the undersigned Notary Public for the State of Alabama/ 
personally appears Buddy Pruitt/ and after being duly sworn/ deposes 
and says; 
1/ Buddy Pruitt/ declare that I am the Plaintiff in the above 
referenced case. I cannot present/ at this time/ by affadavit/ facts 
essential to justify my opposition to the Defendant's Motion To 
Dismiss/ Summary Judgement/ and therefore I asks this Court to deny 
the Defendant's Motion/ or order a continuance so I may; 
1) Obtain affadavits from my family members who have personal 
knowledge of my case and my actions/ concerning my articulated intent 
to keep and rear my child. They also have knowledge of Ms. Sadler's 
abandoning me during her pregnancy/ and the actions of Ms. Sadler's 
family to withhold information about Ms. Sadler's whereabouts and 
intent to place my son for adoption. These affadavits will justify 
^Y opposition to the Defendant's Motion* 
2) Obtain affadavits from persons here at this institution who 
have personal knowledge of my actions/ of diligent efforts/ that will 
justify my opposition to the Defendant's Motion/ 
3) Use discovery to locate Ms. Sadler's whereabouts to obtain 
a deposition from her/ admitting to the Court that she knew of my 
intentions of rearing my son/ and also of her abandoning me during 
her pregnancy/ without any notice whatsoever. This will justify my 
oooosition to the Defendant's Motion. (EXHIBIT #1 page ] of 9\Hj >l 
The Plaintiff moves this Honorable Court to deny the Defendant's 
Motion To Dismiss/ Summary Judgement/ or order a continuance until 
either (a) after the Plaintiff's release date from prison/ on 
January 3/ 2004/ when I'll be rid of my "unique and restricted" 
circumstances of my incarceration/ so I may attempt to timely and 
effectively follow the statutes and rules of court/ or (b) whatever 
time deemed appropiate by this Court. (Copy of my Alabama Department 
of Corrections time sheet containing my release date attached as 
EXHIBIT #2 ) 
I also ask this Court to order Defendant to submit answers to 
my Request for Interrogatories that I served with my Complaint/ so 
I may locate Ms. Sadler for her deposition. 
I further swear that this affadavit is filed in good faith to 
gain custody and a relationship with my son. 
^ / ^ n 
SWORN under the penalty of perjury on thisp^j? day of KlU^JL^ ' 
2003 . 
ma. 
1) » t . O 
•4 VfU f / r^HM^AJL^ <fotsAAQ Kvx^%V<) 
NOTARY PUBLIC Buddy Pruitt 222271 
L.C.F. 15-66B 
28779 Nick Davis RD 
Harvest AL 35749 
MY COMMrSION EXPIRES 
(EXHTRTT ill r-.^™ o ., .,U»J0102 
WOOD CRAPO LLC UT;«!J/'J1-"* n 
Lan-y S. Jenkins (#4854) W A p H ' 0 3 
500 Eagle Gate Tower ^Oi. iL' ° UTJ 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)366-6060 
Attorneys for Defendant The Adoption Center of Choice 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
) 
BUDDY PRUITT, ) MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
) TO R ULE 56(f) MOTION AND 
Plaintiff, ) MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF 
) TIME TO RESPOND TO MOTION 
v. ) TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO 
) STATE A CLAIM 
THE ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE, ) 
JOHN AND JANE DOE (whose names are ) 
unknown), ) 
) Case No. 030402464 
Defendants. ) Judge Gary D. Stott 
) 
Plaintiff, Buddy Pruitt, seeks additional time to respond to defendants motion to 
dismiss, and he seeks time in which he can conduct discovery to support his theory of the case. 
The Court should deny both motions because Mr. Pruitt's efforts are fruitless. It is clear from the 
complaint he has filed that he knew the mother of the child was in Utah planning to place the 
child for adoption. He even obtained ad\ ice ftom a Utah lawyer prior to the time she 
relinquished her child for adoption telling him what he needed to do under Utah law. Rather than 
move immediately, he waited more than seven months until after the adoption had been finalized 
to file his complaint in this Court. Nothing he could do will help him now because he did not 
n n n 7 n 
Mr. Pruitt then wrote to a law firm in Provo, Utah, seeking representation. He 
received a letter dated November 4, 2002, from Mark F. Robinson of Robinson, Seiler & Glazier 
P.C., informing him that u[t]o preserve whatever rights you may have, you will need to proceed 
immediately to file a paternity action and assert the parental rights with the Department of 
Health." Complaint Ex. 10. 
The child was actually bom November 12, 2002, long after Mr. Pruitt knew Ms. 
Sadler was in Utah, and Ms. Sadler relinquished the child to the Adoption Center on 
November 14, 2002, for placement for adoption. See Exhibit B to the memorandum in support 
of defendants' motion to dismiss, which is a copy of Ms. Sadler's Relinquishment and Statement 
of Understanding. Ms. Sadler stated in her Relinquishment that she was not married to the 
father of the child. The Adoption Center obtained a Certificate of Search For Notice of the 
Initiation of Proceedings to Establish Paternity dated November 15, 2002, indicating that as of 
that date no one had filed a notice of the initiation of paternity proceedings with the State 
Registrar of Vital Statistics. A copy of this certificate is attached as Exhibit C to the 
memorandum in support of defendants' motion to dismiss. 
Mr. Pruitt filed the Complaint in this action on May 27, 2003, more than seven 
i 
months after the child had been bom and placed for adoption (and one week after the adoption 
was finalized). Importantly, the Complaint does not state that Mr. Pruitt is fully able and willing 
to have full custody of the child, nor does he agree to a court order of child support or of the 
payment of expenses incurred by Ms. Sadler during her pregnancy and birth of the child. See 
Complaint. The only thing Mr. Pruitt says is that he wants the Court to award custody of the 
HI 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




THE ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE, 
JOHN and JANE DOE, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
CASE NO. 030402464 
JUDGE: GARYD STOTT 
CLERK:KS 
RULING 
The Plaintiff, Mr. Pruitt, has filed a complaint and other documents with the Court 
objecting to an adoption that involved the Defendant and others. The relief he requests is that the 
Court give custody of the child in question to his brother and sister. The complaint does not 
claim that he, as father of the child, is able and willing to accept fiill custody of the child, nor does 
he agree to accept responsibility for payment of any expenses incurred by the natural mother 
during her pregnancy and the birth of the child. Mr. Pruitt does not claim that he has complied 
with the legal requirements of the State of Utah to preserve a claim for paternity as the biological 
father of the child. 
As a result of the documents filed by Mr. Pruitt, the Defendant Adoption Center of Choice 
filed its Motion and Memorandum to Dismiss the Complaint for Failure of the Plaintiff to State a 
Claim. Subsequent documents were filed by the Plaintiff, who is incarcerated in the Alabama 
State Prison. 
From all of the information provided by both parties this Court imus mat Mr. Pruitt 
acknowledges that he is the father of the child born to Lisa Sadler on or about November 12, 
2002. He claims to have learned of the pregnancy on March 26, 2003. After receiving notice 
from the Adoption Center of Choice on October 18, 2002 of their participation for placement of 
the child of Ms Sadler for adoption, Mr Pruitt contacted a law office in Provo, Utah He was 
on 
subsequently advised by that office, on November 4, 2002, some eight days prior to the birth of 
the child, that to protect his claimed interests as the natural father, he would need to file 
"immediately" a claim for paternity and file his documents with the appropriate state agency To 
this date Mr Pruitt has done nothing to comply with the laws of Utah as a natural father claiming 
a paternity interest in a child born in this state, knowing the name of the natural mother, and the 
participation and name of the adoption agency in Utah 
The Supreme Court of Utah has made it very clear that persons in the status of Mr Pruitt 
must strictly comply with all of the requirements of the laws of this state when intending to 
preserve a claim of a natural father of a child (In Re Adoption of W, 904 P 2nd 111, 1121 Utah 
Ct App 1995, In Re Adoption of B B D , 984 P 2nd 967 Utah 1999 ) If the biological father 
fails to protect his rights by strict compliance, such rights are lost It is the finding of this Court 
that Mr Pruitt has failed to state a claim in his complaint sufficient to allow him to proceed 
Further, he has failed to strictly comply with §78-30-4 14 UCA Therefore, having failed to meet 
the requirements of §78-30-4 14 of UCA, Mr Pruitt has waived his rights to contest the 
adoption, to which his consent is not required 
The Defendants' motion is granted Counsel for the Defendant shall prepare and file an 
appropriate order and submit the same to this Court within 20 days of the date of this ruling 
DATED this XI day of AjiQ , 2003 
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THE ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE, 
and John and Jane Doe (whose names are 
unknown), 
Defendants 
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
DATE August 27, 2003 
CASE NO 030402464 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
Division 5 
This matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion to Dismiss Civil Complaint for 
Custody of An Infant Child for Failure to State a Claim. Oral arguments were not requested and 
plaintiff did not file a responsive memorandum The Court will now rule on the motion. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
and PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Court draws these facts from the defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss Civil Complaint for Custody of An Infant Child for Failure to State a Claim and 
plaintiffs verified Civil Complaint for Custody of Infant Child. 
1 Plaintiff claims to be the biological father of a child who was placed for adoption with 
defendant 
2 Plaintiff and the child's mother, Lisa Sadler ("Sadler"), were both residents of 
Birmingham, Alabama when the child was conceived in February of 2002. 
3. Early in the pregnancy plaintiff was sentenced to a twenty-two month term at a state 
prison in Harvest, Alabama 
4 Plaintiff claims that he first learned of Sadler's pregnancy on March 26, 2002, after 
1 
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plaintiff was incarcerated Plaintiff claims that from the moment of learning about his child he 
intended to raise and provide for his child and to be a major part of the child's life 
5 Sadler moved to Utah at sometime between March 26, 2002 and October 18, 2002 
She contacted defendant and arranged to give the child up for adoption 
6 Plaintiff received a request for consent to adoption from defendant on October 18, 
2002 Plaintiff refused to sign the consent form A social worker for defendant spoke with 
plaintiff on October 23, 2002 and explained to him that Sadler had moved to Utah and planned to 
give the child up for adoption 
7 Plaintiff began writing letters to various attorneys and legal aid foundations requesting 
help in contesting the adoption 
8 On October 31, 2002 plaintiff began writing to the Fourth District Court of Utah 
attempting to assert his rights as a parent The Court was unable to process plaintiffs letters and 
requests because no case yet existed concerning plaintiff or the child's adoption 
9 On November 4, 2002, attorney Mark F Robinson of Robinson, Seiler & Glazier, LC, 
located in Provo, Utah, wrote a letter to plaintiff, advising him that Mr Robinson was unable to 
assist plaintiff and instructing him to immediately file a paternity action with the Department of 
Health 
10 The child was born on November 12, 2002 
11 The child was given to defendant for placement for adoption on November 14, 2002 
Sadler signed a relinquishment of hei rights to the child and consent to adoption on that same day 
12 Defendant obtained a Certificate of Search For Notice of the Initiation of Proceedings 
to Establish Paternity on November 15, 2002 The Certificate shows that no one had filed an 
2 
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initiation of paternity proceedings with the State Registrar of Vital Statistics. 
13 Plaintiff filed a "Putative Father Intent to Claim Paternity Registration" form with the 
Alabama Department of Human Resources on December 12, 2002. 
14. The Alabama Department of Human Resources acknowledged receipt of plaintiffs 
registration form and his successful application to the Putative Father Registry on February 7, 
2003 
15. Finally, on May 23, 2003 plaintiff filed a verified Civil Complaint for Custody of 
Infant Child asking the Court to dismiss the adoption petition and to hold an evidentiary hearing 
to determine an appropriate custodian for the child. 
16. On June 9, 2003 defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Complaint for Custody of 
an Infant Child for Failure to State a Claim (<(Motion to Dismiss"). An accompanying 
supportive memorandum was filed that same day. 
17. Plaintiff did not file a responsive memorandum. 
18 The Court received a notice to submit for the Motion to Dismiss on June 30, 2003 
DISCUSSION 
The Utah legislature has clearly established that "an unmarried biological father has the 
primary responsibility to protect his rights." Utah Code Ann. 78-30-4 12(3)(d) (2003). The 
process for adoption is very particularly set out in the Code and specific requirements have been 
established for unmarried biological fathers who want to have legal rights to their children. The 
legislature very carefully weighed the interests of the persons involved in an adoption - the 
biological mother, the adoptive parents, the child and the biological father - and the legislature 
decided that "an unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that acquires constitutional 
3 
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protection only when he demonstrates a timely and full commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood." Utah Code Ann. 78-30-4.12(2)(e) (2003). 
The Court must begin its analysis with the presumption that an unmarried biological father 
knows that the child may be adopted without his consent unless he strictly complies the 
requirements for establishing paternity. Utah Code Ann. 78-30-4.12(3)(e) (2003). The rule that 
the Court must follow is that "the consent of an unmarried biological father [to adoption] is 
necessary only if the father had strictly complied with the requirements of this section." Utah 
Code Ann. 78-30-4.14(2) (2003). 
Plaintiff learned of Sadler's pregnancy very early on and, to his credit, he was happy for 
the birth of the child and glad for the opportunity to be a parent. Regardless of whether plaintiff 
approved of Sadler's decision to move to Utah, the record is very clear that plaintiff was aware 
that Sadler moved to Utah prior to the birth of the child. As evidence of this fact the Court refers 
to the Answer, Objection and Denial of Consent to Adoption of Unborn Child that plaintiff 
mailed to the Fourth District Court for the State of Utah on October 31, 2002. This document 
shows that plaintiff was aware of the adoption and was aware of his responsibility to adhere to 
proper legal procedures to establish his paternal rights to the child according to Utah law. 
Unfortunately, the Court can not find any evidence in the file that plaintiff strictly adhered 
to Utah's requirements for establishing paternity. Plaintiff was required to do three things to 
establish paternity: (1) initiate proceedings to establish paternity according to Title 78, Chapter 
45e, Uniform Act on Paternity, (2) file a notice of the commencement of paternity proceedings 
with the state registrar of vital statistics, and (3) pay a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses 
incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth in accordance with his 
4 
means Utah Code Ann. 78-30-4.14(2)(b) (2003). Further, all of these conditions had to be 
accomplished prior to the time the mother executed her consent for adoption or relinquished the 
child to a licenced child-placing agency. Utah Code Ann. 78-30-4.14(2)(b) (2003). 
The mother, Sadler, gave the child to defendant on November 14, 2002 and she also 
executed a consent to adoption on that same day. To strictly comply with the statutes plaintiff 
must have complied with the three requirements above prior to November 14, 2002. 
The Court finds plaintiff did not timely comply with the statutory requirements. Plaintiff 
did initiate proceedings to establish paternity in May of 2003, but the statute requires that plaintiff 
have taken this action prior to November 14, 2002. Utah law requires that an unmarried 
biological father must strictly comply with the legal steps. Utah Code Ann. 78-30-4.12(3)(b) 
(2003). 
The Court also finds no evidence that plaintiff has filed a notice of the commencement of 
paternity proceedings. Defendant provided evidence that no notice was filed with the Utah State 
Registrar of Vital Statistics prior to November 14, 2002, and plaintiff has not provided any 
evidence that would prove otherwise. Plaintiff was aware that he needed to file a paternity action 
with the Department of Health because he received a letter from a Utah attorney expressly 
instructing him to do so. Plaintiff did register with the Alabama Putative Father Registry but the 
Utah statute requires him to file with the Utah State Registrar of Vital Statistics. Filing with the 
Alabama registry does not satisfy the Utah requirements. Even if the Court were to consider the 
filing with the Alabama registry, it was not timely done. Plaintiff needed to file on or before 
November 14, 2002, but plaintiff did not file with the Alabama registry until he was almost a 
month late on December 12. 
5 
Addressing the third requirement, the Court is aware of plaintiffs difficult circumstances 
Plaintiff tried to arrange for care of Sadler and the child even though he was incarcerated and 
unable to directly provide for Sadler Plaintiff has also demonstrated to the Court that he is 
unable to afford an attorney and has participated in this action pro se Considering the means 
available to plaintiff, he probably fulfilled the third requirement as far as he is able 
However, plaintiff did not strictly comply with all three of the statutory requirements of 
Utah Code Ann 78-30-4 14(2)(b) (2003) and, therefore, did not establish his parental rights 
before the mother relinquished the child to a child-placing agency 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Civil Complaint for Custody of An Infant Child for 
Failure to State a Claim is granted 
The Court orders counsel for defendant to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and an order consistent with this ruling, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration 
DATED this Qt day of August, 2003 
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Buddy Pruitt 222271 
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ADOPTION CENTER of 
CHOICE/ et al/ 
DEFENDANTS. 
CASE NO. 030402464 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
RULE 59(e) MOTION 
Comes now the Plaintiff/ Buddy Pruitt/ pro se/ in the above 
entitled cause/ and moves this Honorable Court to grant this notion/ 
in pursuant to Rul£ 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ to 
alter/ amend/ or vacate this Court's judgement/ dated August 27/ 2003/ 
in which granted the Adoption Center of Choice's Motion To Dismiss 
against the Plaintiff-
This Motion i£ supported by a memorandum of law filed contemp-
oraneously * 
DATED t h i s / 5 ~ j 3 a y of iSgftjgfn ^ f c ^ ,2003 . 
\XjiiAAi\Wvu 'iu^t 
Buddy Prtfitt 222271 
Limestone C F . 
28779 Nick davis RD. 
Harvest Alabama 35749 00014,9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE, 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of September 2003/ I have 
filed the foregoing Rule 59(e) Motion to the 4th District Court/ Provo/ 
by placing the same in the U.S. Certified Mail/ return receipt requested/ 
postage prepaid/ addressed as follows: 
4th District Court 
125 North 100 West 
Provo Utah 84601 
A true copy of the foregoing Rule 59(e) Motion was served on the 
Adoption Center of Choice by placing the same in the U.S. Mail/ postage 
prepaid/ addressed as follows: 
(Attorney for Adoption Center of Choice) 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
500 Eagle gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City/ Utah 84111 
DATED on this 15th day of September 2003. 
(tPiMkwm 
Buddy Pruitt 222271 
Limestone C.F. 
28779 Nick Davis RD 
Harvest Alabama 35749 
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ADOPTION CENTER of 
CHOICE/ et al/ 
DEFENDANTS. 
CASE NO. 030402464 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RULE 59(e) MOTION 
This is a civil action filed by the Plaintiff/ Buddy Pruitt/ 
for custody of his illegitimate child whom the Defendant/ Adoption 
center of Choice(hereinafter/ the Agency)/ has placed for adoption 
with John and Jane Doe/ co-DefendantS/ by an unwarranted termination 
of the Plaintiff's parental rights in pursuant to § 78-30-4.14 (Utah 
Code)/ therefore violating Mr. Pruitt1s right of due process. Mr. 
Pruitt claims that he's entitled to contest the adoption under §78-
30-4.15 (Utah Code). The Agency has filed a Motion To Dismiss/ claiming 
that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. On June 26/ 2003/ 
Mr. Pruitt filed a Motion For Enlargement of Time/ asking permision 
to respond to the Agency's Motion To Dismiss. At the same time/ Mr. 
Pruitt filed a Motion For order Under Rule 56. On July 10/ 2003/ the 
Agency filed their Memorandum In Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motions. 
Then Mr. Pruitt filed his reply Memorandum/ and also an Addendum To 
his Rule 56 Motion on July 20/ 2003. Finally Mr. Pruitt filed his 
Notice To Submit For Decision on July 22/ 2003. This Court has not
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ruled on/ or even acknowledged/ the Plaintiff's Motions/ and has 
to the Plaintiff", then the above listed allegations from Mr. Pruittfs 
Complaint show that Mr. Pruitt1s circumstances show that it was impos-
sible for him to file his acknowledgement of paternity/ pursuant to 
§78-30-4.14/ through no fault of his own/ and that Mr. Pruitt meets the 
requirements of §78-30-4.15. This entitles Mr. Pruitt to contest the 
adoption of his son. 
Mr. Pruitt clearly shows that he has the substance and merit to 
his claim/ and the Defendant's Motion To Dismiss should be denied. 
3# CQUBT^SHQULD,H&YE^GIYEH,MBm,EBUITT^QEEUBTUNITY,TQ 
&MEND_COMEll&IHT 
According to the facts in Mr. Pruitt's Complaint/ Mr. Pruitt has 
met the requirements of §78-30-4.15 and is entitled to contest the adopt-
ion of his son. Therefore/ it can not be found that Mr. Pruitt's plead-
ing could not be cured by allegations of other facts or ammendment of 
Complaint. 
At the least/ the Court should have provided Mr. Pruitt with notice 
of deficiencies and an oppurtunity to ammend his Complaint/ before dis-
missing his Complaint for failure to state a claim. 
As stated in Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories/ 622 F.2d 458 (9th 
Cir. 1980); A pro se litigant must be given leave to ammend his or her 
complaint unless it is "absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the 
complaint could not be cured by ammendment". Id. at 460. 
"The law is clear that before a district court may dismiss a pro se 
complaint for failure to state a claim/ the court must provide the pro 
se litigant with notice of deficiencies of his or her complaint and an 
oppurtunity to ammend the complaint prior to dismissal"# McGuckin v. 
Smith/ 974 F.2d 1050 at 1055 (9th Cir. 1992). 
00 3163 
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Unskilled in the law, Mr. Pruitt is far more prone to errors in 
pleading than the person who benefits from the representation of coun-
sel and "The requirement that the courts provide a pro se litigant 
with notice of the deficiencies in his or her complaint help$ ensure 
that the pro se litigant can use the oppurtunity to amend effectively11/ 
Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1987). 
A. THE^QEERATIQM^QE^§78T3Q-4^14^W&S^.U13CQMSTITUTIQ!gAL,AS 
&EBLIED-TO-MB«-BBUrTT 
The Utah Supreme Court considered the operation of §78-30-4.14 
(Utah Code) in Ellis vs. Social Services Department of the Church of 
Latter day Saints, Utah/ 615 P.2d 1250 (1980), and said, " a statute 
fair upon its face may be shown to be void and unenforceable as applied. 
Id. at 1256. 
The Court also found that if the putative father "is successful 
jn showing that the termination of his parental rights was contrary to 
basic notions of due process, and that he came foward within a reason-
able time after the baby's birth, he should be deemed to have complied 
with the statue". Id. at 1256. 
The same consideration of the operation of 578-30-4.14, as being 
void and unenforceable, should be given to Mr. Pruitt's case, due to 
the fact that he learned of Ms. Sadler's whereabouts and intention of 
placing their child for adoption, just three,(3), weeks prior to the 
child's birth and relinquishment to the Agency, and that the Plaintiff 
had no access to Utah statutes to allow him to effectively file a timely 
paternity action in the state of Utah. 
Again, the Utah Supreme Court considered the fairness of the op-
eration of 578-30-4.14 as applied to the father in the case of In rspi^lCo 
the circumstances of this case/ however/ including 1) the clearly artic-
ulated intent of the father to keep and rear the child/ 2) the full 
knowledge of that intent on the part of all involved/ 3) the represen-
tations made by the mother [to jointly raise the child togetherl/ 4) 
the actions of her family [deliberately withheld information of birth 
mother's whereabouts in order to avoid potential "problems" with the 
father/ who they knew would obstruct the adoption!/ 5) the premature 
birth/ 6) the non-residencey of the father coupled with his absence 
at the time of birth/ we can not say that this was either a usual case 
or that notice may be implied. We therefore conclude that the appellant 
has successfully shown "that termination of his parental rights was 
contrary to basic notions of due process/ and that he came foward with-
in a raesonable time after the baby's birth/ [such thatl he should be 
deemed to have complied with the statute11 • Id. at 691. 
The following circumstances in Mr. Pruitt's case are identical to 
those of the father in "Baby Boy Doe"; 
1) Mr. Pruitt made known/ from the very beginning/ of his clearly 
articulated intent to keep and rear his child/ and everyone involved 
had full knowledge of his intent. 
2) The representations made by Ms. Sadler (to jointly raise their 
child together with Mr. Pruitt). 
3) Actions of Ms. Sadler's family (mainly Ms. Sadler's 19 year old 
daughter/ Leigh Anne Urley/ deliberately withholding information of 
Ms. Sadler's whereabouts). 
4) The non-residency of Mr. Pruitt coupled with his absence at the 
time of birth. 
Therefore/ according to the Court's decision in "Baby Boy Doe"/ 
000161 
the facts of Mr. Pruitt1s case successfully show that the termination 
of his parental rights was contraryy to basic notions of due process. 
5* IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR MR. PRUITT TO FILE THE REQUIRED 
NOTICE OF PATERNITY PRIOR TO THE STATUTORY 
BAR# THROUGH NO FAULT OF HIS OWN 
When Mr. Pruitt learned of this intended adoption/ he immediately 
attempted to establish paternity by/ 1) phoning the Agency to deny his 
consent for adoption and asserted his parental rights/ 2) mailing the 
Agency and the 4th District Court/ Provo/ a notarized letter/ asserting 
his parental rights/ accepting responsibility of his parental obligations/ 
denying his consent for adoption/ and demanding custody of his child/ 
3) wrote the 4th District Court and asked for assistance in establish-
ing his parental rights and gaining custody of his son/ and also made 
his need of legal representation known to the Court/ 4) contacted the 
Alabama Dept. of Human resources for assistance in establishing paternity 
and obtaining custody of his son/ 5) registering with the Alabama Dept. 
of Human Resources his Notice To Claim Paternity/ 6) began a nationwide 
search for legal representation/ and or/ guidence/ and 7) began research-
ing Alabama and feceral cases and statutes in order for the Plaintiff 
to fight for custody of his son. 
Despite the fact that the Plaintiff in this case had no access to 
Utah statutes/ Mr. Pruitt diligently attempted to establish paternity 
with the limited resources availible to him in the prison law library. 
Referring back to "Ellis"/ the Court stated/ "It is conceiveable/ 
however/ that a situation may arise when it is impossible for the father 
to file the required notice of paternity prior to the statutory bar/ 
through no fault of his own. In such a case, due process requires that 
he be permitted to show that he was not afforded a reasonable oppur-
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tunity to comply with the statute* Ellis/ 615 P.2d at 1256. 
Mr* Pruitt does admit to knowing that Ms. Sadler was living in 
Utah/ but he did not learn of this until three weeks prior his child's 
birth and relinquishment to the Agency by Ms. Sadler. But the father 
in "Baby Boy Doe" knew three months prior to his child's birth and re-
linquishment by the child1s mother. In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe/ 
717 P.2d 686. 
If the Court ruled in "Baby Boy Doe" that three months didn't 
afford the father a reasonable oppurtunity to take action/ surely it 
would be a logical assumption that three weeks may have not been enough 
time to afford Mr. Pruitt a reasonable oppurtunity to take action/ 
especially considering Mr. Pruitt's almost identical circumstances to 
the father's in "Baby Bo^ r Doe"/ and Mr. Pruitt's unique circumstances 
due to his incarceration. 
The Court found in Padro vs. Heffelfinger/ 110 F.R.D. 333/ that/ 
"pro se civil rights pleadings are to be liberally construed and time 
restraints for prisoner filings are subject to "equitable considerations" 
relating to prisoners' "unique circumstances". 
Therefore/ this Court should conclude from the foregoing that the 
termination of Mr. Pruitt's parental rights is arbitrary and contrary 
to the basic notion of due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Ammendment of the United States Constitution. 
MR. PRUITT HAS MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF $78-30-4.15. 6. ' 
IN WHICH ENTITLES HIM TO CONTEST THE ADOPTION 
OF HIS CHILD 
The (4) requirements of §78-30-4.15 to entitle a father the right 
to contest the adoption of his child are as follows; 
(a) the unmarried biological father resides and has resided in anoAhep::-
state where the unmarried mother was also located or resided; 
(b) the mother left that state without notifying or informing the 
unmarried biological father that she could be located in the state of 
Utah; 
(c) unmarried biological father has/ through every reasonable means/ 
attempted to locate the mother but does not know or have reason to know 
that the mother is residing in the state of Utah; and 
(d) the unmarried biological father has complied with the most strin-
gent and complete requirements of the state where the mother previously 
resided or was located/ in order to protect and preserve his parental 
interest and right in the child in cases of adoption. 
First/ Mr# Pruitt and Ms. Sadler both resided in Alabama. Next/ 
Ms. Sadler left the state of Alabama without notifying Mr. Pruitt that 
she was leaving the state/ nor that she could be located in the state 
of Utah. Next/ Mr. Pruitt and his family attempted to locate Ms. Sadler/ 
through all reasonable means/ but were unsuccessful in doing so. Mr. 
Pruitt did not know or have reason to know that Ms. Sadler could be 
located in Utah. Finally/ Mr. Pruitt filed his Notice of Paternity 
within (30) days of his son's birth/ with the Dept. of Human Resources 
Putative Father Registry/ in accordance with Alabama statute 26-10C-l# 
in which allows him to power of consent over an adoption in the state 
of Alabama. 
Therefore/ Mr. Pruitt has met his burden of compliance with $78-
30-4.15/ and should be entitled to contest the adoption of his child. 
1. CQURT^FAII;ED,TQ,BULE^0!3.,MR^^PBUITT!S,PENDI13G M0TI08S 
With his Complaint/ Mr. Pruitt submitted a Motion To Proceed In 
Form Pauperis and a Motion To Be Appointed Counsel. Not only did the 
Court not rule on these Motions/ the Court didn't acknowledge them. 
In Miles vs. Dept. of Army, 881 F.2d 777 (9th Cir.)/ the Court 
stated that/ "The District court did abuse its discretion/ however/ 
in failing to rule on Miles's request for counsel before granting the 
Government's motion to dismiss. Id. at 784. 
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Attorney for Defendant The Adoption Center of Choice 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BUDDY PRU1TT, 
Plaintiff. 
FINDINGS OF FA CT AND 
CONCL US IONS OF LA W 
v. 
THE ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE, 
JOHN AND JANE DOE (whose names are 
unknown), 
Defendants. 
Case No. 030402464 
Judge C4audia Laycoclo 
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This matter came before the Court on defendant's Motion to Dismiss Civil 
Complaint for Custody of An Infant Child for Failure to State a Claim. The Court, having 
reviewed the e\idence and the law7, and being full} advised in the premises, now makes the 
following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff claims to be the biological father of a child who was placed for 
adoption with defendant. 
2. Plaintiff and the child's mother. Lisa Sadler ("Sadler"), were both 
residents of Birmingham, Alabama when the child was concehed in Fehruan. 2002. 
3. Early in the pregnancy, plaintiff was sentenced to a twenty-two month 
term at a state prison in Harvest, Alabama. 
4. Plaintiff claims that he first learned of Sadler's pregnane} on March 26, 
2002, after plaintiff was incarcerated. Plaintiff claims that from the moment of learning about 
his child he intended to raise and provide for his child and to be a major part of the child's life. 
5. Sadler moved to Utah sometime between March 26. 2002 and October 1 8, 
2002. She contacted defendant and arranged to give the child up for adoption. 
6. Plaintiff did try to arrange for the care of Sadler and the child e\ en though 
he was incarcerated and unable to directly provide for Sadler. Plaintiff is also unable to afford an 
attorney as he has participated pro se in this action. Thus, it is clear he has very limited financial 
means. 
7. Plaintiff receixed a request for consent to adoption from defendant on 
October 18, 2002. Plaintiff refused to sign the consent form. 
8. A social worker for defendant spoke w ith plaintiff on October 23, 2002 
and explained to him that Sadler had moved to Utah and planned to give the child up for 
adoption in Utah. 
9. Plaintiff began writing letters to various attorneys and legal aid 
foundations requesting help in contesting the adoption. 
2 
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10. On October 31, 2002, plaintiff began waiting to the Fourth District Court 
of Utah attempting to assert his rights as a parent. The Court was unable to process plaintiffs 
letter and requests because no case yet existed concerning plaintiff or the child's adoption. 
11. On November 4, 2002, attorne\ Mark F. Robinson of Robinon. Seiler & 
Glazier, LC, located in Provo, Utah wrote a letter to plaintiff advising him that Mr. Robinson 
was unable to assist plaintiff and instructing him to immediately file a paternity action with the 
Department of Health Thus, plaintiff was aware that he needed to file a paternit}' action with the 
Department of Health before the child was born. 
12. Plaintiff was clearh aware of the planned adoption and was aware of his 
responsibility to adhere to proper legal procedures to establish his parental rights to the child 
according to Utah law. 
13. The child was born on November 12, 2002. 
14. The child was given to defendant for placement for adoption on 
November 14, 2002. Sadler signed a relinquishment of her rights to the child and consent to 
adoption on that same day. 
15. Defendant obtained a Certificate of Search for Notice of the Initiation of 
Proceedings to Establish Paternity on November 15, 2002. The Certificate shows that no one had 
filed an initiation of paternity proceedings with the State Registrar of Vital Statistics. 
16. Plaintiff filed a "Putative Father Intent to Claim Paternity Registration'" 
foim with the Alabama Department of Human Resources on December 12, 2002. 
Dions 
17. The Alabama Department of Human Resources acknowledged receipt of 
plaintiffs registration form and his application to the Putathe Father Registn on februan 7, 
2003. 
18 On May 23, 2003 plaintiff filed a verified Ci\il Complaint for Custod) of 
Infant Child asking the Court to dismiss the adoption petition and to hold an evidentian hearing 
to determine an appropriate custodian for the child. 
19. On June 9, 2003 defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Ci\ il Complaint for 
Custody of an Infant Child for Failure to State a Claim and an accompanying supportive 
memorandum. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact and documents in evidence the Court make^ 
the following conclusions of law: 
1. The Utah legislature has elearh established that "an unmarried biological 
fathei has the primal) responsibility to protect his rights." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(3)(d) 
(2003). Specific requirements have been established for unmarried biological fathers who want 
to have legal rights to their children. 
2. The legislature has carefully weighed the interests of the persons invoh ed 
in an adoption—the biological mother, the adoptive parents, the child, and the biological 
father—and the legislature has declared that "an unmarried biological father has an inchoate 
interest that acquires constitutional protection onl) when he demonstrates a timeh and full 
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2)(e) (2003). 
4 
3. It is presumed that an unmarried biological father knows that the child 
ma} be adopted without his consent unless he stricth complies with the requirements for 
establishing paternity. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(3)(e) (2003). 
4. u[lk]he consent of an unmarried biological father [to adoption] is necessan 
only if the father has strictly complied with the requirements of this section." Utah Code Ann. 
§78-30-4.14(2) (2003). 
5. Plaintiff was required to do three things to establish paternity: (1) initiate 
proceedings to establish paternity according to Title 78, Chapter 45e, Uniform Act of Paternity, 
(2) file a notice of commencement of paternity proceedings with the sate registrar of vital 
statistics, and (3) pay a fair share and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred in connection 
with the mother's pregnane} and the child's birth in accordance with his means. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4.14(2)(b) (2003). 
6. All of these conditions had to be accomplished prior to the time the mother 
executed her consent for adoption or relinquished the child to a licensed child-placing agency. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b) (2003). 
7. Utah law requires that an unmarried biological father strictly comply with 
the legal steps to establish paternity. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(3)(b) (2003). 
8. Regardless of whether plaintiff approved of Sadler's decision to move to 
Utah, the record is very clear that plaintiff was aware that Sadler moved to Utah prior to the birth 
of the child. Plaintiff was also aware of his responsibiht} to adhere to proper legal procedures to 
establish his paternal rights to the child according to \ Itah law. 
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9. The mother, Sadler, gave the child to defendant on November 14, 2002. 
and she also executed a relinquishment to defendant on that same da\. To stricth comph with 
the statutes, plaintiff must have strictl) complied with the requirements to establish paternit\ 
prior to November 14, 2003. 
10. Plaintiff did not timely comph with the statutory requirements. He did 
initiate paternity proceedings in Ma). 2003, but the statute requires that plaintiff ha\e taken this 
action prior to November 14, 2002. 
11. No evidence was presented that plaintiff has filed a notice of the 
commencement of paternity proceedings with the state registrar of vital statistics at any time. 
Plaintiff did register with the Alabama Putathe Father Registry, but the Utah statute requires him 
to file with the Utah state registrar of vital statistics. Filing with the Alabama registry does not 
satisfy the Utah requirements. 
12. Even if the Court were to consider the filing with the Alabama registn. it 
was not timely done. Plaintiff needed to file on or before No\ ember 14, 2002, but plaintiff did 
not file with the Alabama registry until he was almost a month late on December 12, 2002. 
13. Considering the verj limited financial means available to plaintiff, he 
likely did "pay a fair share and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred in connection with 
the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth" as far as he was able. 
14. However, plaintiff did not strictly comply with all three of the statutory 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b) (2003) and, therefore, did not establish his 
parental rights before the mother relinquished the child to a child-placing agency. 
6 
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15. Based on the foregoing, defendant's Motion to Dismiss Civil Complaint 
for Custody of An Infant Child for Failure to State a Claim should be granted and this action 
should be dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this :2^Kla} of September. 2003. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify this -^ da\ of September. 2003, that I caused a true and correct 
cop> of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LA W'to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Budd) Pruitt AIS# 222271 
Limestone Corr. Facility 
28779 Nick Daus Rd 
Harvest, AL 35749 
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Larn S Jenkins (#4854) 
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60 East South Temple 
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Attorne) s for Defendant The Adoption Center of Choice 
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THE ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE. ; 
JOHN AND JANE DOE (w hose names are ; 
unknow n). ] 
Defendants. ] 
) ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
) WITH PREJUDICE 
) Case No 030402464 
1 Judge Claudia Laycock 
Based on the Court's Ruling on Motion to Dismiss, issued on August 28, 2003, 
and on the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered contemporaneously 
herewith, and good cause appearing, the Court is of the opinion that plaintiffs Civil Complaint 
for Custody of An Infant Child should be dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
1. That defendant's Motion to Dismiss Ci\ il Complaint for Custod\ of An 
Infant Child for Failure to State a Claim is granted 
t iOO r 9 0 
2. That plaintiffs Civil Complaint for Custody of An Infant Child is hereh} 
dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this ^ v ^ d a ) of September, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
fe~ >VA. 
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Fourth Qisrfct Court J u d g 4 § X ^ ^ ^ V < 5 % 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify this da> of September, 2003, that I caused a true and correct 
cop) of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Buddy PruittAIS# 222271 
Limestone Corr. Facility 
28779 Nick Da\ is Rd. 
Harvest, AL 35749 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
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THE ADOPTION CENTER OF 
CHOICE, INC., a Utah corporation, 
JOHN AND JANE DOE (whose names 
are unknown), 
Defendants. 
of Utah County State of Utah 
RULING 
Case No. 030402464 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) Motion. The Court has 
re\ iewed all relevant memoranda, case law and statutory provisions, and being fully advised in the 
matter, issues the following ruling. 
RULING 
On August 27, 2003, this Court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs 
Complaint and the Complaint was dismissed with prejudice. On September 19, 2003, Plaintiff 
filed his Rule 59(e) Motion to alter, amend, or vacate the Court's August 27, 2003 judgment. 
Defendants filed their Memorandum in Opposition on or about October 2, 2003. 
This Court finds that Plaintiff has not provided a sufficient basis upon which the Court 
may justify any alteration, amendment or dismissal of the Court's August 27, 2003 judgment. The 
undisputed facts demonstrate that Mr. Pruitt did not perform the steps required under Utah law to 
establish rights to the child at issue. Nothing in Mr. Pruitt's Rule 59(e) Motion indicates 
otherwise. 
000203 
I, Although Mr. Pruitt is a non-resident biological father, he failed to fully 
comply with the requirements of U.C.A. §78-30-4.15(4) and is therefore not 
entitled to protection under U.C.A. §78-30-4.15(4). 
Section 78-30-4.15(4) of the Utah Code governs the duties of a non-resident unmarried 
biological father when contesting an adoption. This Section sets forth a four-part test and states. 
(4) The Legislature finds that an unmarried biological father who resides in another 
state may not, in every circumstance, be reasonably presumed to know of, and 
strictly comply with, the requirements of this chapter. Therefore when all of the 
following requirements have been met, that unmarried biological father may 
contest an adoption, prior to fmalization of the decree of adoption, and assert his 
interest in the child; the court may then, in its discretion, proceed with an 
evidentiary hearing under Subsection 78-30-4.16(2): 
(a) the unmarried biological father resides and has resided in another state 
where the unmarried mother was also located or resided; 
(b) the mother left that state without notifying or informing the unmarried 
biological father that she could be located in the State of Utah; 
(c) the unmarried biological father has, through every reasonable means, 
attempted to locate the mother but does not know or have reason to know that 
the mother is residing in the State of Utah; and 
(d) the unmarried biological father has complied with the most stringent and 
complete requirements of the state where the mother previously resided or was 
located, in order to protect and preserve his parental interest and right in the 
child in cases of adoption. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4.15(4). 
This Court finds that Mr. Pruitt, as a resident of Alabama, failed to comply with each of 
these four factors, did not met the requirements of Utah law, and is therefore denied protection 
under U.C.A. §78-30-4.15(4). Mr. Pruitt failed to comply with two of these factors as follows: 
First, the unmarried biological father, Mr. Pruitt, and the child's mother, Lisa Sadler, were 
both residents of Birmingham, Alabama when the child was conceived in February of 2002. 
Second, Ms. Sadler left the State of Alabama and moved to Utah sometime between 
March 26, 2002 and October 18, 2002. Mr. Pruitt claims his communications with Ms. Sadler 
ceased in July of 2002. 
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Third, Mr. Pruitt admits that he received paperwork from the Adoption Center of Choice 
on October 18, 2002. On October 23, 2002, Mr. Pruitt spoke with a social worker from the 
Adoption Center of Choice who explained to Mr. Pruitt that Ms. Sadler had moved to Utah and 
planned to give the child up for adoption. Thereafter, Mr. Pruitt contacted several Utah 
attorneys. Mr. Pruitt even obtained advice from a Utah attorney prior to Ms. Sadler's 
relinquishment informing him of what he was required to do under Utah law. Consequently, this 
Court finds that Mr. Pruitt had actual knowledge of Ms. Sadler's relocation to Utah at least one 
month prior to the child's birth on November 12, 2002. 
Finally, this Court finds that Mr. Pruitt's compliance with Alabama law is untimely. 
Section 78-30-4.15(4) specifically states that each requirement must be met "prior to finalization 
of the decree of adoption." Here, Mr. Pruitt made efforts to comply with the most stringent and 
complete requirements of Alabama law by acting in accordance with the relevant Alabama statute, 
Section 26-10c-l, which states in pertinent part: 
(i) Any person who claims to be the natural father of a child and fails to file his 
notice of intent to claim paternity pursuant to subsection (a) prior to or within 30 
days of the birth of a child born out of wedlock, shall be deemed to have given an 
irrevocable implied consent in any adoption proceeding. 
Ala. Code Ann. §26-10c-l(i) (emphasis added). 
Mr. Pruitt filed a "Putative Father Intent to Claim Paternity Registration" form with the Alabama 
Department of Human Resources on December 12, 2002, exactly one month after the child's 
birth. Although Mr. Pruitt may have complied with this portion of Alabama law, his compliance 
v^as untimely because Ms. Sadler relinquished her rights and consented to the adoption on 
November 14, 2002. 
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Therefore, because Mr. Pruitt failed to comply with the requirements found in U.C.A. 
§78-30-4.15(4)(c) and (d), he is not entitled to protection under U.C.A. §78-30-4.15(4) and must 
be judged according to the standard outlined in U.C.A. §78-30-4.14. 
II. Because Mr. Pruitt failed to secure protection under U.C.A. §78-30-4.15(4), 
he is not excused from the strict compliance standard imposed upon Utah 
residents under U.C.A. §78-30-4.14. 
Mr. Pruitt must be held to the strict compliance standard outlined in Section 78-30-4.14 of 
the Utah Code, which states: 
(5) An unmarried biological father who does not fully and strictly comply with each of 
the conditions provided in this section, is deemed to have waived and surrendered any 
right in relation to the child, including the right to notice of any judicial proceeding in 
connection with the adoption of the child, and his consent to the adoption of the child 
is not required. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4.14(5) (emphasis added). 
Thus, Mr. Pruitt must have fully and strictly complied with the three-part test set forth in 
Section 78-30-4.14(2)(b) of the Utah Code, which provides: 
(2)(b) With regard to a child who is under six months of age at the time he is placed 
with adoptive parents, an unmarried biological father shall have manifested a full 
commitment to his parental responsibilities by performing all of the acts described in 
this subsection prior to the time the mother executes her consent for adoption or 
relinquishes the child to a licensed child-placing agency. 
The father shall: 
(i) initiate proceedings to establish paternity under Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform 
Act on Paternity, and file with that court a sworn affidavit stating that he is fully 
able and willing to have full custody of the child, setting forth his plans for care of 
the child, and agreeing to a court order of child support and the payment of 
expenses incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth; 
(ii) file notice of the commencement of paternity proceedings with the state 
registrar of vital statistics within the Department of Health, in a confidential 
registry established by the department for that purpose, which notice is considered 
• filed when the notice is entered in the registry of notices from unmarried biological 
fathers; and 
(iii) if he had actual knowledge of the pregnancy, paid a fair and reasonable 
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amount of the expenses incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy and 
the child's birth, in accordance with his means, and when not prevented from doing 
so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4.14(2)(b) (emphasis added). 
The Court finds that Mr. Pruitt failed to comply with this three-part test as follows: 
First, Mr. Pruitt did not initiate proceedings until May 23, 2003, six months after Ms. 
Sadler had relinquished her rights to the child, when he filed his verified Civil Complaint for 
Custody of Infant Child. Furthermore, according to Section 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(I), Mr. Pruitt 
should have initiated proceedings under 78-45a, the Uniform Act on Paternity. Mr. Pruitt, as the 
putative father, was required to file a petition or voluntary declaration executed in accordance 
with Section 78-45e. Section 78-45e-2(3) states, "The voluntary declaration of paternity may be 
completed and signed any time after the birth of the child. A voluntary declaration of paternity 
may not be executed or filed after consent to or relinquishment for adoption has been signed." 
Mr. Pruitt never filed a voluntary declaration of paternity in accordance with Section 78-45e and 
Ms. Sadler signed the relinquishment papers on November 14, 2002. Therefore, Mr. Pruitt 
missed his window of opportunity by failing to file a voluntary declaration of paternity or initiate 
proceedings prior to the relinquishment of the child for adoption. 
Second, Mr. Pruitt never filed a notice with the State Registrar of vital statistics within the 
Department of Health and consequently, no notice has ever been entered in the registry of notices 
from unmarried fathers. 
Third, Mr. Pruitt had no information regarding the actual costs of delivery, however, prior 
to the birth of the child, this Court finds that Mr. Pruitt had not paid a fair and reasonable amount 
of those expenses incurred in connection with Ms. Sadler's pregnancy. 
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This Court concludes that Mr. Pruitt did not strictly comply with the provisions contained 
in Section 78-30-4.14 by failing to initiate proceedings in a timely manner, file a notice with the 
State Registrar, or pay for pregnancy expenses and is therefore not entitled to object to any 
petition or release of the child for adoption. 
III. Mr, Pruitt's Rule 59(e) Motion is not timely and must be denied. 
Mr. Pruitt claims to make his Motion according to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
59(e), which states: 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
U.R.C.P., Rule 59(e). 
This Court entered its judgment on August 27, 2003. Mr. Pruitt filed his Rule 59(e) Motion on 
September 19, 2003, well beyond the ten-day limit outlined in Rule 59(e). Mr. Pruitt's Motion 
was not timely and is therefore denied. 
III. Mr. Pruitt's Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond and Motion for 
Order Under Rule 56 are moot. 
Mr. Pruitt alleges that this Court has "not ruled on, or even acknowledged, the Plaintiffs*s 
Motions..." This Court was required to review the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss prior to 
reviewing Mr. Pruitt's Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond and Motion for Order Under 
Rule 56. The Defendants' Notice to Submit for Decision on their Motion to Dismiss was filed on 
June 30, 2003. Mr, Pruitt's Notice to Submit for Decision on his various Motions was filed on 
July 28, 2003. This Court subsequently dismissed Mr. Pruitt's Complaint. This Court's Ruling 
dismissing Mr. Pruitt's Complaint makes his Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond and 




For the above reasons, this Court finds that Mr. Pruitt has not demonstrated full 
compliance with the provisions of U C.A. §78-30-4.15(4) and is therefore required to strictly 
comply with the provisions of U.C.A. §78-30-4.14. This Court also finds that Mr. Pruitt failed to 
strictly comply with the provisions of U.C.A. §78-30-4.14 and is therefore not entitled to object 
to any petition or release of the child for adoption. Furthermore, this Court finds that Mr. Pruitt's 
Ruled 59(e) Motion was not timely. Therefore, this Court concludes that the August 27, 2003 
Ruling is proper and Mr. Pruitt's Rule 59(e) Motion is denied. 
Counsel for Defendants shall prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it to 
the Court for signature within twenty (20) days of the date of this ruling. 
DATED this \ r \ day of December, 2003. ^fa**^^ 
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W O O D C R A P O I L C 
Larry S. Jenkins (#4854) 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)366-6060 
Attorneys for Defendant The Adoption Center of Choice 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BUDDY PRUTTT, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
V . j 
THE ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE, ; 




) Case No. 030402464 
> Judge Gary D. Stott 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) Motion. The Court 
has reviewed all relevant memoranda, case law and statutory provisions, and being fully advised 
in the matter, issues the following Order. 
On August 27, 2003, this Court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs 
Complaint and the Complaint was dismissed with prejudice. On September 19,2003, Plaintiff 
filed his Rule 59(e) Motion to alter, amend, or vacate the Court's August 27, 2003 judgment. 
Defendants filed their Memorandum in Opposition on or about October 2, 2003. 
This Court finds that Plaintiff has not provided a sufficient basis upon which the 
Court may justify any alteration, amendment or dismissal of the Court's August 27, 2003 
judgment. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Mr. Pruitl did not perform the steps required 
under Utah law to establish rights to the child at issue. Nothing in Mr. Pruitt's Rule 59(e) Motion 
indicates otherwise. 
I, Although Mr. Pruitt is a non-resident biological father, he failed to fully 
comply with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4) and is 
therefore not entitled to protection under Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15( 4). 
Section 78-30-4.15(4) of the Utah Code governs the duties of a non-resident 
unmarried biological father when contesting an adoption. This Section sets forth a four-part test 
and states: 
(4) The Legislature finds that an unmarried biological father who 
resides in another state may not, in every circumstance, be 
reasonably presumed to know of, and strictly comply with, the 
requirements of this chapter. Therefore when all of the following 
requirements have been met, that unmarried biological father may 
contest an adoption, prior to finalization of the decree of adoption, 
and assert his interest in the child; the court may then, in its 
discretion, proceed with an evidentiary hearing under Subsection 
78-30-4.16(2): 
(a) the unmarried biological father resides and has resided in 
another state where the unmarried mother was also located or 
resided; 
(b) the mother left that state without notifying or informing the 
unmarried biological father that she could be located in the State of 
Utah; 
(c) the unmarried biological father has, through every reasonable 
means, attempted to locate the mother but does not know or have 
reason to know that the mother is residing in the State of Utah; and 
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(d) the unmarried biological father has complied with the most 
stringent and complete requirements of the state where the mother 
previously resided or was located, in order to protect and preserve 
his parental interest and right in the child in cases of adoption. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4). 
This Court finds that Mr. Pruitt, as a resident of Alabama, failed to comply with 
each of these four factors, did not met the requirements of Utah law, and is therefore denied 
protection under Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4). Mr. Pruitt failed to comply with two of these 
factors as follows: 
First, the unmarried biological father, Mr. Pruitt, and the child's mother, Lisa 
Sadler, were both residents of Birmingham, Alabama when the child was conceived in February 
of 2002. 
Second, Ms. Sadler left the State of Alabama and moved to Utah sometime 
between March 26, 2002 and October 18, 2002. Mr. Pruitt claims his communications with Ms. 
Sadler ceased in July of 2002. 
Third, Mr. Pruitt admits that he received paperwork from the Adoption Center of 
Choice on October 18, 2002. On October 23, 2002, Mr. Pruitt spoke with a social worker from 
the Adoption Center of Choice who explained to Mr. Pruitt that Ms. Sadler had moved to Utah 
and planned to give the child up for adoption. Thereafter, Mr. Pruitt contacted several Utah 
attorneys. Mr. Pruitt even obtained advice from a Utah attorney prior to Ms. Sadler's 
relinquishment informing him of what he was required to do under Utah law. Consequently, this 
Court finds that Mr. Pruitt had actual knowledge of Ms. Sadler's relocation to Utah at least one 
month prior to the child's birth on November 12, 2002. 
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Finally, this Court finds that Mr. Pruitt's compliance with Alabama law is 
untimely. Here, Mr. Pruitt made efforts to comply with the most stringent and complete 
requirements of Alabama law by acting in accordance with the relevant Alabama statute, Section 
26-1 Oc-1, which states in pertinent part: 
(i) Any person who claims to be the natural father of a child and 
fails to file his notice of intent to claim paternity pursuant to 
subsection (a) prior to or within 30 days of the birth of a child born 
out of wedlock, shall be deemed to have given an irrevocable 
implied consent in any adoption proceeding. 
Mr. Pruitt filed a "Putative Father Intent to Claim Paternity Registration" form 
with the Alabama Department of Human Resources on December 12, 2002, exactly one month 
after the child's birth. Although Mr. Pruitt may have complied with this portion of Alabama law, 
his compliance was untimely because Ms. Sadler relinquished her rights and consented to the 
adoption on November 14, 2002. 
Therefore, because Mr. Pruitt failed to comply with the requirements found in 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4)(c) and (d), he is not entitled to protection under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4) and must be judged according to the standard outlined in Utah Code Ann. 
§78-30-4.14. 
IL Because Mr. Pruitt failed to secure protection under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4.15(4), he is not excused from the strict compliance standard 
imposed upon Utah residents under Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14. 
Mr. Pruitt must be held to the strict compliance standard outlined in Section 
78-30-4.14 of the Utah Code, which states: 
(5) An unmarried biological father who does not fully and strictly 
comply with each of the conditions provided in this section, is 
deemed to have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the 
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child, including the right to notice of any judicial proceeding in 
connection with the adoption of the child, and his consent to the 
adoption of the child is not required. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(5). 
Thus, Mr. Pruitt must have fully and strictly complied with the three-part test set 
forth in 
Section 78-30-4. 14(2)(b) of the Utah Code, which provides: 
(2 )(b) With regard to a child who is under six months of age at the 
time he is placed with adoptive parents, an unmarried biological 
father shall have manifested a full commitment to his parental 
responsibilities by performing all of the acts described in this 
subsection prior to the time the mother executes her consent for 
adoption or relinquishes the child to a licensed child-placing 
agency. The father shall: 
(i) initiate proceedings to establish paternity under Title 78, 
Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on Paternity, and file with that court a 
sworn affidavit stating that he is fully able and willing to have full 
custody of the child, setting forth his plans for care of the child, 
and agreeing to a court order of child support and the payment of 
expenses incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy and 
the child's birth; 
(ii) file notice of the commencement of paternity proceedings with 
the state registrar of vital statistics within the Department of 
Health, in a confidential registry established by the department for 
that purpose, which notice is considered filed when the notice is 
entered in the registry of notices from unmarried biological fathers; 
and 
(iii) if he had actual knowledge of the pregnancy, paid a fair and 
reasonable amount of the expenses incurred in connection with the 
mother's pregnancy and the child's birth, in accordance with his 
means, and when not prevented from doing so by the person or 
authorized agency having lawful custody of the child. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b). 
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The Court finds that Mr. Pruitt failed to comply with this three-part test as 
follows: First, Mr. Pruitt did not initiate proceedings until May 23, 2003, six months after Ms. 
Sadler had relinquished her rights to the child, when he filed his verified Civil Complaint for 
Custody of Infant Child, Furthermore, according to Section 78-30-4. 14(2)(b )(1), Mr. Pruitt 
should have initiated proceedings under 78-45a, the Unifonn Act on Paternity. Mr. Pruitt, as the 
putative father, was required to file a petition or voluntary declaration executed in accordance 
with Section 78-45e. Section 78-45e-2(3) states, "The voluntary declaration of paternity maybe 
completed and signed any time after the birth of the child. A voluntary declaration of paternity 
may not be executed or filed after consent to or relinquishment for adoption has been signed." 
Mr. Pruitt never filed a voluntary declaration of paternity in accordance with 
Section 78-45e and Ms. Sadler signed the relinquishment papers on November 14, 2002. 
Therefore, Mr. Pruitt missed his window of opportunity by failing to file a voluntary declaration 
of paternity or initiate proceedings prior to the relinquishment of the child for adoption. 
Second, Mr, Pruitt never filed a notice with the State Registrar of vital statistics 
within the Department of Health and consequently, no notice has ever been entered in the registry 
of notices from unmarried fathers. 
Third, Mr. Pruitt had no information regarding the actual costs of delivery, 
however, prior to the birth of the child, this Court finds that Mr. Pruitt had not paid a fair and 
reasonable amount of those expenses incurred in connection with Ms. Sadler's pregnancy. 
This Court concludes that Mr. Pruitt did not strictly comply with the provisions 
contained in Section 78-30-4.14 by failing to initiate proceedings in a timely manner, file a notice 
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with the State Registrar, or pay for pregnancy expenses and is therefore not entitled to object to 
any petition or release of the child for adoption. 
III. Mr. Pruitt's Rule 59(e) Motion is not timely aud must be denied. 
Mr. Pruitt claims to make his Motion according to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 59(e), which states: 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or 
amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after the 
entry of the judgment. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e). 
This Court entered its judgment on August 27, 2003. Mr. Pruitt filed his Rule 
59(e) Motion on September 19, 2003, well beyond the ten-day limit outlined in Rule 59(e). Mr. 
Pruitt's Motion was not timely and is therefore denied. 
IV. Mr. Pruitt's Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond and Motion for 
Order Under Rule 56 are moot. 
Mr. Pruitt alleges that this Court has "not ruled on, or even acknowledged, the 
Plaintiffs's Motions..." This Court was required to review the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
prior to reviewing Mr. Pruitt's Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond and Motion for Order 
Under Rule 56. The Defendants' Notice to Submit for Decision on their Motion to Dismiss w as 
filed on June 30, 2003. Mr. Pruitt's Notice to Submit for Decision on his various Motions was 
filed on July 28, 2003. This Court subsequently dismissed Mr. Pruitt's Complaint. This Court's 
Ruling dismissing Mr. Pruitt's Complaint makes his Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond 
and Motion for Order Under Rule 56 moot. 
( j ( j ' >? :H 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED 
1. That Mr. Pruitt has not demonstrated full compliance with the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4), and that he was, therefore, required to strictly comply with the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14. 
2. That Mr, Pruitt failed to strictly comply with the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-30-4.14 and is therefore not entitled to object to any petition or release of the child for 
adoption. 
3. That Mr. Pruitt's Rule 59(e) Motion was not timely. 
4. Therefore, the August 27, 2003 Ruling is proper and Mr. Pruitt's Rule 59(e) 
Motion, therefore, is DENIED. 




Gary D.Stott, Judge 
Fourth Judicial DistricJ^Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify this 2 day of January, 2004, that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing proposed ORDER to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Buddy PruittAIS# 222271 
Limestone Corr. Facility 
28779 Nick Davis Rd. 
Harvest, AL 35749 
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ADOPTION CENTER OF 
CHOICE, 
JOHN and JANE DOE, 
(Whose names are unknown), 
DEFENDANTS, 
RESPONDANTS. 
Case No. 030402464 
u
*h e <SM-H 
& A/i'm 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Buddy Pruitt, the pro se Plaintiff in the above styled cause, 
appeals from the ruling of the 4th District Court, Utah County, 
Judge Gary D Stott, which granted the Defendant's Motion To Dismiss, 
that dismissed the Plaintiff's civil action to obtain custody of 
his illegitimate son; The Plaintiff now takes this appeal to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
Dated this/4 day of^^t\\j^ofly , 
200_^f_. 
\ 
s/3kJ A \wfck 
"j 
Buddy Pruitt 222271 
Limestone C.F. 
28779 Nick Davis RD. 
Harvest Alabama 35749 
J0021R 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL upon: 
4th District Court 
125 North 100 West 
Provo Utah 84601 
AND 
(Attorney for Adoption Center of Choice) 
Wood Crapo LLc 
Larry S. Jenkins 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
by placing the -same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid and properly 
a d d r e s s e d , on this_J<^ day ofjy^(Ari4iSJ 
,200_¥_-
Buddy Pruitt 222271 
Limestone C.F. 
28779 Nick Davis RD 
Harvest AL 35749 
